University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers

Working Papers

2013

Libertarian Paternalism, Path Dependence, and Temporary Law
Tom Ginsburg
Jonathan Masur
Richard H. McAdams

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/public_law_and_legal_theory
Part of the Law Commons

Chicago Unbound includes both works in progress and final versions of articles. Please be
aware that a more recent version of this article may be available on Chicago Unbound, SSRN or
elsewhere.
Recommended Citation
Tom Ginsburg, Jonathan Masur & Richard H. McAdams, "Libertarian Paternalism, Path Dependence, and
Temporary Law" (University of Chicago Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 431, 2013).

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Working Papers at Chicago Unbound. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers by an authorized administrator of
Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

CHICAGO
COASE-SANDOR INSTITUTE FOR LAW AND ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER NO. 645
(2D SERIES)
PUBLIC LAW AND LEGAL THEORY WORKING PAPER NO. 431

LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM, PATH DEPENDENCE, AND
TEMPORARY LAW
Tom Ginsburg, Jonathan S. Masur, and Richard H. McAdams

THE LAW SCHOOL
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
June 2013
This paper can be downloaded without charge at the Institute for Law and Economics Working Paper
Series: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html and at the Public Law and Legal Theory
Working Paper Series: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/academics/publiclaw/index.html
and The Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection.

Libertarian Paternalism, Path Dependence,
and Temporary Law
Tom Ginsburg, Jonathan S. Masur, &
Richard H. McAdams

INTRODUCTION
The recent wave of behavioral economics has led some theorists to
advocate the possibility of “libertarian paternalism,” where regulators
designing institutions permit significant individual choice but nonetheless
use default rules to “nudge” cognitively biased individuals toward
particular salutary choices.1 In this article, we add the possibility of a
different kind of nudge: temporary law.
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The term comes from Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism is
not an Oxymoron, 70 Chi. Law Rev. 1159 (2003) (advocating default rules and other types of
“choice architecture” to overcome cognitive limitations without depriving individuals of
choice) and Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, 93 Am. Econ. Rev.
175 (2003) (same). For the comprehensive statement of their approach, with many policy
examples, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN & RICHARD H. THALER, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2009). See also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain
Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 NW. U. LAW REV. 1165 (2003) (identifying the limited
conditions under which behavioral psychology justifies paternalism); Colin Camerer, et al.,
Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for ‘Asymmetric Paternalism,’ 151
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1211 (2003) (defending paternalism through mechanisms such as default rules
and cooling off periods that benefit those subject to cognitive limitations without
constraining others); J.D. Trout, Paternalism and Cognitive Bias, 24 LAW & PHIL. 393, 409-11
(2005) (justifying paternalism with cognitive biases, but arguing for the least intrusive
intervention). The influence of the idea extends beyond legal scholarship See David C
Wheeler, et al., Applying Strategies from Libertarian Paternalism to Decision Making for Prostate
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The case for temporary law arises from a particular regulatory
rationale. In some cases, the best normative defense of regulation against
the libertarian critique, i.e., the best response to the claim that free market
competition produces efficiency, is path dependence,2 the idea that market
institutions can become “trapped” or “locked in” to a suboptimal
equilibrium, where some better equilibrium exists. For our purposes, it
suffices to define an equilibrium as a behavioral outcome that is stable in
this way because no one individual gains by changing behavior, given
what the other individuals are doing.3 Some situations allow for multiple
equilibria, that is, multiple behavioral patterns that, once reached, are stable.
When this is true, there is no reason to expect that the outcome that market
Specific Antigen (PSA) Screening, 11 BMC CANCER 148, 149 (2011) (proposing default rules
and information framing to nudge patients away from unnecessary PSA screening).
For criticisms, see Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 133
(2006) (arguing that bounded rationality undermines the case for paternalism where
individuals have a stronger incentive to overcome bias and "choose well" when purchasing
than when voting); Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism is an Oxymoron, 99 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 1245 (2005) (critiquing libertarian paternalism on multiple grounds).
2 The literature on path dependence spans the social sciences. See, e.g., BRIAN ARTHUR,
INCREASING RETURNS AND PATH DEPENDENCE IN THE ECONOMY (1994) (providing an economic
theory of path dependence); Scott E. Page, Path Dependence, 1 Q.J. POL. SCI. 87 (2006)
(reviewing the use of path dependence in political science theory); James Mahoney, Path
Dependence in Historical Sociology, 29 THEORY AND SOCIETY 507 (2000) (reviewing path
dependence in history and sociology). Not surprisingly, there is no single meaning of the
term, but we follow a common usage in referring to the fact that the equilibrium that exists
is not be the only one possible with the same parameters (individual preferences and
wealth) but that trivial differences in starting points or exogenous events along the way
produced the current equilibrium. For a criticism of the concept as applied to product
markets, see S. J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History, 11
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205 (1995).
3 Put differently, an equilibrium is a pattern of individual behavior “that may be
rationally sustained as unique best responses to each other.” See Roger B. Myerson, Justice,
Institutions, and Multiple Equilibria, 5 CHICAGO J. INT’L L. 92 (2004). More technically, in game
theory, a “Nash equilibrium”
is based on the principle that the combination of strategies that players
are likely to choose is one in which no player could do better by choosing
a different strategy given the ones the others choose. [In two-player
games, a] pair of strategies will form a Nash equilibrium if each strategy
is one that cannot be improved upon given the other strategy. We
establish whether a particular strategy combination forms a Nash
equilibrium by asking if either player has an incentive to deviate from it.
DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER, & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW,
310 (1996) (emphasis deleted).
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competition produces will inevitably be the best one, the global social
optimum. Instead, it may be merely a “local maximum.” The outcome that
occurs therefore depends arbitrarily on the behavioral starting point;
different paths do not all lead to efficiency.4
A few legal scholars have explored the relevance of path dependent
legal evolution,5 particularly in corporate law.6 The fields of intellectual
property and antitrust are concerned with the path dependence of
technological change.7 But the general literature on regulation has, quite
surprisingly, not appreciated the importance of the concept to discussions
of market failure, a shortcoming we hope to correct. Most importantly for
our purposes, the literature has failed to note this rather surprising
implication: temporary law may have a significant advantage over
permanent law. Where the rationale for regulation is to overcome path
dependence, there is no need for a permanent restriction on liberty and
there are several critical reasons to make the restriction temporary.

4 There are several technical matters of path dependence that need not detain us. For
example, one might distinguish between path dependence that arises because of trivial
differences in initial conditions from path dependence that arises because of identical initial
conditions combined with random differences in intervening events. The analysis that
follows will work under different assumptions about how path dependency arises.
5 See Richard A. Posner, Path-Dependency, Pragmatism, and a Critique of History in
Adjudication and Legal Scholarship, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 573 (2000); Oona A. Hathaway, Path
Dependence in the Law: The Course and Patterns of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86
Iowa L. Rev. 601 (2001) (identifying three types of path dependency and finding examples
of each in the common law); Alain Marciano & Elias L. Khalil, Optimization, Path Dependence
and the Law: Can Judges Promote Efficiency?, 32 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 72 (2012) (critiquing path
dependency claims about the inefficiency of judge-made law). See also Clayton P. Gillette,
Lock-in Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L. REV. 813 (1998) (claiming that path dependence
affects the development of informal social norms as much as the development of formal
law).
6 See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting, 74
WASH. U. L.Q. 347 (1996); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence
in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999); Amir N. Licht, The Mother
of All Path Dependencies: Toward a Cross-Cultural Theory of Corporate Governance Systems, 26
DEL. J. CORP. L. 147 (2001).
7 See Mark Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86
CAL. L. REV. 479, 488-99 (1998). An early example of the economic literature is Brian W.
Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events, 99 ECON.
J. 116 (1989). For a recent review of that literature, see Joseph Farrell & Paul Klemperer,
Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects, in 3 HANDBOOK
OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1967 (2007) (surveying the economic literature).
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We thus propose imagining regulations that include an expiration
date. Our principal example for illustrating these points is the regulation of
smoking in public places, a field that has seen substantial change in recent
years. Libertarians and other market optimists assert that, in the absence of
government regulation, competition among private suppliers produces the
optimal number of non-smoking establishments – malls, restaurants, bars,
apartment buildings.8 Yet when the government did not regulate, nonsmokers felt that there were an insufficient number of non-smoking
options. In many jurisdictions, there were literally no non-smoking bars,
meaning that there was no good option for non-smokers.
What does it mean for non-smokers to complain that, without
government intervention, the market is underserving their needs? One
possibility is that the only equilibrium consisted of a small number of nonsmoking options because smokers cared much more about the issue than
non-smokers. In other words, if the only choice is smoking, non-smokers
patronize the establishment and grumble, but if the only choice is nonsmoking, smokers stay home and withhold their patronage altogether. This
is the intuition of the libertarian, who explains that non-smokers are being
hypocritical because they are not willing to pay sufficiently to induce bars,
restaurants, and other establishments to switch to non-smoking.
Yet there is a second possibility: path dependence. For reasons
explored below, rational mechanisms and behavioral biases could have
created a situation where the same set of preferences and levels of wealth
permit at least two equilibrium outcomes, one with a high proportion of
smoking establishments and the other with low proportion. In this context,
an equilibrium means that no owner of an establishment has any incentive
to change the smoking status of the establishment because they are making
as much or more profits by the smoking policy they have. If there are
multiple equilibria, then it is possible that the low smoking equilibrium is
optimal, and we have reached the high smoking equilibrium only because
of the happenstance that our starting point from decades ago, when
preferences and beliefs about were different, involved high smoking rates
and near-universal tolerance of smoking. Had history been different, the
same preferences (the ones that existed before smoking bans) could have
See Thomas Lambert, The Case Against Smoking Bans, REGULATION, Winter 34 (20062007) (arguing against smoking bans); Eric A. Feldman and Ronald Bayer, Introduction, in
UNFILTERED 6-7 (Eric A. Feldman and Ronald Bayer, eds., 2004) (describing the libertarian
objections).
8
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sustained a different and lower level of smoking establishments. If freedom
of choice and market competition is consistent with two behavioral
patterns, we should want to reach the efficient pattern, not the one that
happens to first emerge.
Given path dependence, it is desirable to use law to shift society
from the high-smoking to the low-smoking equilibrium. Across a large
domain of issues besides smoking, the best argument that can be made for
legal intervention and the most charitable interpretation of the arguments
that are made is exactly this point: that the status quo is trapped in an
inefficient equilibrium and that law will shift the system to a more
desirable equilibrium, one that is also consistent with individual choice to
satisfy existing preferences.
The possibility that multiple equilibria exist in a variety of
regulatory contexts has never been thoroughly considered. Part of this
article’s contribution is to identify a list of mechanisms that can produce
this situation. Our main point, however, is to explain why, when this
argument applies, the best response is usually a temporary law. If the
problem is path dependence, a temporary law will often be both necessary and
sufficient to move behavior to the more efficient outcome. For example, suppose
the status quo among a city’s restaurants is a high-smoking equilibrium
(95% permit smoking) and we believe there is a more efficient lowsmoking equilibrium (10% permit smoking). If the temporary law bans
smoking in all restaurants for a certain time period (say two years), it
pushes toward a zero-smoking outcome. When the law is removed,
restaurant owners will decide whether to allow smoking again; many will.
But the implication of there being a low-smoking equilibrium is that the
number of restaurants allowing smoking will rise from zero to the number
the low-smoking equilibrium represents (10%) and then stop. In short, the
concept of path dependence identifies the importance of arbitrary starting
points; temporary law offers a new “starting” point, resetting the system to
allow the emergence of the equilibrium with the lowest smoking levels.
It should be immediately apparent that the temporary law cannot
be a first best solution. The first best solution would be to move directly to
the more efficient equilibrium. In the smoking example, part of the cost of
the temporary ban is the inefficiency of having too few restaurants – zero –
that allow smoking during the period the law is in effect. If the efficient
low-smoking equilibrium is that 10% of restaurants allow smoking, then
the state could just create licenses equal to 10% of the restaurants and
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allocate them by auction or lottery, enforcing a ban only against unlicensed
restaurants. If this is the situation, there is no great advantage to making
the law temporary, as a permanent law merely requires people to do what
they already want to do in equilibrium.
The problem, however, is that this first best, direct solution
demands costly or unobtainable information. We might have no good way
of estimating the exact location of the low-smoking equilibrium. And here
we see the possible advantage of a temporary law. If we are uncertain
where the low-smoking equilibrium is -- perhaps it is 10% of restaurants,
but it could be as high as 35% or as low as 5% -- we will likely grant too
many or too few licenses, thereby forcing an inefficient level of smoking
indefinitely. With the temporary law, the short-term inefficiency is likely
greater – requiring 0% smoking restaurants is too low – but lasts for only a
limited period, after which voluntary exchange produces the low smoking
equilibrium.
This revelation – what might be called equilibrium location – is only
the first informational advantage of temporary law. For the second, assume
there is also uncertainty or ambiguity about the entire situation just
described. There may be multiple equilibria, but there is also some chance
that there is really only one behavioral pattern consistent with existing
preferences and free exchange. If so, the libertarian has a good reason to
assert that the status quo already represents the efficient outcome. The
licensing scheme then imposes a severe inefficiency (10% of restaurants are
smoking when 95% is efficient) for an indefinite time. It also offers no
mechanism for revealing whether the licensing scheme represents a
suboptimal outcome. But when the temporary law expires, if the premise
on which it was based were false, and there is only one equilibrium, then
restaurants will return to their initial level of permitting smoking (95%).
We will then learn that there was no market failure to be solved. Thus,
temporary law works like an experiment. The information it reveals is both
equilibrium location and what might be called equilibrium verification..
We identify a number of other advantages to temporary law. By
verifying and locating the other equilibrium, one saves on enforcement
costs, as by definition there is no need to enforce an equilibrium. There is
also the promise of greater intellectual honesty: once temporary law is a
salient part of the regulatory toolkit, those who claim that path dependence
justifies regulation will only propose temporary law, while those who
propose permanent law will be forced to claim some justification other
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than path dependence. Finally, temporary law is a form of political
compromise that might decrease the costs of political struggles..9
Proponents of regulation will accomplish their goal but will but by
accepting an expiration date bear the costs of extension. Opponents of
regulation will be less opposed to temporary rules than permanent ones.
Furthermore, if the proponents and opponents of regulation have genuine
uncertainty about the consequences of a particular intervention, they might
welcome the information revealed by the temporary law.
Situations of multiple equilibria are common, and we offer a
number of examples to demonstrate the phenomenon. In rational choice
theory, there are various kinds of coordination games that have multiple
equilibria.10 We discuss these situations, but we also emphasize the role of
bounded rationality and cognitive biases. Cognitive limitations often
produce an important asymmetry: the operation of various biases favor the
status quo and are therefore capable of stabilizing more than one behavioral
outcome, should it become the status quo. Consider, for example, the
availability heuristic, by which people tend to overestimate the occurrence
of things readily called to mind.11 In a world where restaurant smoking is
permitted, it may be easier for restaurant owners to call to mind those
smoking customers they will lose by prohibiting smoking than to imagine
non-smoking customers whom they haven’t met whose patronage they
will gain from a smoking ban. After living with a smoking ban, however,
the reverse is true: the actual non-smoking customers they will lose from
permitting smoking are more salient than potential smoking customers they
will gain. By shifting the composition of the baseline set of customers, a
temporary ban can change the beliefs of the restaurant owners in a way
that makes their behavior sticky.
Jacob Gersen, Temporary Legislation, 74 U. CHICAGO L. REV. 247 (2007) (offering a
positive political theory explaining when legislation is made temporary).
10 See RUSSELL W. COOPER, COORDINATION GAMES 9 (1999) (describing coordination
games and noting that “history matters in these games and uncovering the influence of the
past on the selection of an equilibrium is important.”); Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the
Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory, and Law, 82 SOUTH. CAL. L. REV. 173 (2009)
(arguing that legal scholarship overuses the prisoners’ dilemma and fails to exploit the
insights of coordination games with multiple equilibria); Richard H. McAdams, Conventions
and Norms: Philosophical Aspects, in 4 INT’L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCES, 2735, 2736-38 (N.J. Smelser & P.B. Baltes, eds., 2001) (explaining conventions as
solutions to recurrent coordination games).
11 See infra text accompanying notes 41-42.
9
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Another example is the problem of forecasting one’s affect. The
happiness literature shows that people adapt to new situations more
quickly than they expect.12 Thus, smokers who have no experience at nonsmoking restaurants may expect to be miserable at them and to take a long
time to adjust to being unable to smoke; they therefore avoid all the nosmoking restaurants when there are only a few of them. After living with a
complete ban, however, they adjust to the experience (by not smoking for a
period or stepping outside) more quickly than they predicted and are
therefore willing occasionally to patronize non-smoking restaurants.
Although they still prefer smoking restaurants, their occasional patronage
of non-smoking restaurants means that more restaurants will stay nonsmoking. We explore these points more systematically below.
Thus, the domain we identify for temporary law, where it is
presumptively superior to permanent law, is when (1) it appears there are
multiple equilibria and the status quo is trapped in an inefficient one; and
(2) there are informational barriers to identifying the superior equilibrium.
We also consider some costs of temporary law that renders it unsuitable in
certain contexts.
This article sits at the intersection of two different legal literatures.
First, there are a handful of articles on temporary legislation. Jacob Gersen
has offered a positive political theory of temporary legislation, arguing that
it advantages the legislature over the executive. As a normative matter,
Gersen speculates that temporality might desirably spread decision costs
over time in a way which might lead to better informed regulation,
particularly for newly recognized risks.13 Yair Listokin identifies the
advantages of experimenting with legal policy.14 If there is uncertainty over
the effects of a proposed law, one might adopt a law temporarily, assess
the results, and then decide whether to renew the law, with or without
modification. Policymakers should therefore choose highly variable

See infra text accompanying notes 48.
Gersen, supra note 9.
14 Yair Listokin, Learning Through Policy Variation, 118 YALE L.J. 480 (2008) (advocating
the value of policy reversibility in cost-benefit analysis; facing uncertainty, reversibility
allows the policymaker to learn, retaining new policies that produce net benefits and
abandoning those that produce net costs). See also Michael Abramowicz, Ian Ayres, & Yair
Listokin, Randomizing Law, 159 U. PENN. LAW REV. 929 (2011) (recommending the use of
legal experiments by changing law for limited and randomly selected subpopulations and
observing the results).
12
13
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policies when they can be easily reversed or altered and lower-variance
policies when it will be more difficult to make changes after the fact.15
These theories do not discuss the problem of path dependence; as a
result, the rationales they provide for temporary law are more contingent.
For Gersen and Listokin, there is always the alternative of enacting a
permanent law and later repealing it if the results show the law to be a
failure. So the choice between a formally permanent and temporary law is
merely a matter of allocating the burden of future change either on the
law’s opponents who must secure repeal or the law’s proponents who
must secure renewal. That is an interesting normative trade-off, but it is
entirely distinct from the rationale we explore.
When the argument for regulating is the existence of multiple
equilibria and path dependence, the case for temporary law is less
contingent. In this setting, one wants the law to lapse after a time not
because it has failed, but in order to allow it to succeed. The law’s success
cannot be judged while it is in effect, but only after it expires, when a new
equilibrium does or does not emerge. If the new equilibrium is the same as
the status quo ante, the rationale for regulation is rejected. If the new
equilibrium is something different and better, the rationale is affirmed but
the regulation is no longer necessary. If we are committed incrementalists
and the costs of overcoming legislative inertia are sufficiently low, it might
make sense for almost all laws to be temporary. But even if we reject
incrementalism16 and the costs of overcoming legislative inertia are high,
we would still argue for temporary law to address the problem of path
dependence.
This article engages and extends a second literature: the project of
behavioral economics to identify important policy implications of cognitive
limitations and behavioral biases. Of course, rational choice mechanisms
can also create path dependence, as some of our examples will show. For
that reason, the normative case for temporary law need not depend on the
findings of behavioral research. But we find that the most easily
generalized reason for multiple equilibria and path dependence is the
asymmetric effects of cognitive biases. Those biases will often push in favor
of the status quo, so that two arbitrarily different starting points can

Id.
For a shrewd analysis of its costs, see Saul Levmore, Interest Groups and the Problem
with Incrementalism, 158 U. PA. L REV. 815 (2010).
15
16
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produce two different equilibria. Only by accident will the bias favor the
selection of the efficient equilibrium.
This article fits broadly within the debate Sunstein and Thaler
started with their defense of “libertarian paternalism.”17 In many (though
not all) of the examples, the temporary law we explore is unquestionably
paternalistic. Yet temporary paternalism is better for the libertarian than
the permanent kind. It may even ultimately be less intrusive on liberty than
some of the “nudges” Sunstein and Thaler defend. Beyond a simple
temporal compromise, the possibility of temporary legislation forces
greater intellectual honesty on those who advocate some restriction on
liberty. If the advocate of regulation relies on the claim of multiple
equilibria and path dependence, then she should presumptively favor
merely temporary legislation. If, over time, temporary legislation exposes
the general falsity of claims of path dependence, then it will strengthen the
hand of the libertarian to resist even temporary paternalism. The final
advantage of temporary law is that it may serve the value of liberty in this
manner. A primary implication of our analysis is that many laws, including
many anti-smoking laws, should be repealed (after which we suspect there
would remain far fewer smoking establishments than existed prior to the
ban).
The paper proceeds as follows. In Part I we explain the behavioral
forces that can lead to multiple equilibria and path dependence with a
particular case study: bans on smoking in public places. In Part II we
generalize from this example and describe the advantages and
disadvantages of temporary legislation, focusing on its role in exposing
situations of path dependence. Part III offers a suggestive empirical study
of a temporary smoking ban, using the example of an actual (albeit
unintended) temporary ban that governed Champaign, Illinois. Part IV
extends the analysis to other examples, including seat belt regulation,
affirmative action, traffic regulation, curfews, and bank holidays and
trading circuit-breakers . Part V concludes.

17

Sunstein and Thaler, supra note 1; see other citations supra note 1.
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I. MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA AND THE EXAMPLE OF SMOKING BEHAVIOR
Markets produce equilibria, and naïve free market advocates tend
to assume that these equilibria are always efficient. But the fact that a
competitive market has generated a particular equilibrium does not mean
that the equilibrium is socially optimal, even if the equilibrium is the
product of voluntary exchange with low transaction costs. Rather, both
behavioral biases and rational choice mechanisms can create situations in
which multiple equilibria are possible. The choice of equilibrium in such
situations is then path dependent: different starting points and histories
generate different behavioral patterns, even when other underlying
parameters are constant. When the status quo is trapped in an inferior
equilibrium, temporary regulation may work to move the population to a
better equilibrium.
We develop these points using the controversy surrounding
smoking regulation. We have in mind the laws that have increasingly
prohibited smoking in various public and now private spaces: hospitals,
airports, shopping malls, stadia, theatres, restaurants, bars, hotels, cars
carrying child passengers, and apartments.18 Despite their popularity, there
is in most cases a reasonable libertarian/free market argument against the
regulation.19
In this Part, we use only the example of smoking bans, though we
shall later generalize the analysis.
A.

The Libertarian/Economic Argument Against Smoking Bans

Smoking bans have become increasingly popular in the United
States and around the world in the years since California enacted the first
ban in 1994. At this writing, twenty one states have now enacted statewide

Secondhand Smoke and Cardiovascular Effects: Making Sense of the Evidence 109-24
(2010) (reviewing history of smoking bans); Charles Shipan and Craig Volden, The
Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 840 (2008) (describing diffusion of smoking
bans in the United States).
19 See Lambert, supra note 8. These specific arguments are applications of the analysis of
market libertarians stated in classic works such as MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE
TO CHOOSE (1980); and FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960).
18
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smoke-free laws governing workplaces, restaurants, and/or bars.20 A
growing number of cities and counties across the country have also taken
action, and one source reports that 2300 municipalities have bans in some
form, up from 89 in 1985.21
The spread of smoking bans has resulted from a number of factors.
One is the growing awareness of the health dangers associated with
smoking.22 The Center for Disease Control reports that 19.3% of Americans
smoke as of 2010, down from 33.2 in 1980.23 As the percentage of voters
who are smokers has declined, it has become easier for smoking bans to
pass.24 Finally, the spread of smoking bans is also an example of what
political scientists call “policy diffusion,” in which jurisdictions copy the
policies of other jurisdictions.25
See Ronald Bayer and James Colgrove, Children and Bystanders First: The Ethics and
Politics of Tobacco Control in the United States, in UNFILTERED 22 (Eric A. Feldman and Ronald
Bayer, eds., 2004).
21 Id.
22 The 1964 Surgeon General’s report on smoking is widely cited as a turning point.The
Health Consequences of Smoking: A Report of the Surgeon General, May 27, 2004. See
Theodore R. Marmor and Evan S. Lieberman, Tobacco Control in Comparative Perspective, in
UNFILTERED 275, 276 (Eric A. Feldman and Ronald Bayer, eds., 2004).
23Centers for Disease Control; Surveillance for Selected Tobacco-Use Behaviors -United
States,
1900-1994
available
at
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00033881.htm#00000794.htm (Table 2 has
1980 data); Adult Cigarette Smoking in the United States: Current Estimate, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/fact_sheets/adult_data/cig_smoking/index.htm
[2010 data]. Nevertheless, some believe that legal regulation has been a failure in that levels
of smoking remain higher than they ought to be, a fact they attribute to cognitive biases that
distort analysis of risk. Jon D. Hanson and Douglas A. Kysar, The Joint Failure of Economic
Theory and Legal Regulation, in SMOKING: RISK, PERCEPTION AND POLICY (Paul Slovic, ed.,
2001).
24 Furthermore, there are a non-trivial number of smokers who support smoking bans,
most likely as a commitment device to help them quit. See Joni Hersch, Smoking Restrictions
as a Self-Control Mechanism, 31 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5 (2005) (finding that smokers who
plan to quit and especially those failed to quit on a previous occasion support public
smoking bans as an aid to quitting). See also Silke Anger, Michael Kvasnicka, & Thomas
Siedler, One Last Puff? Public Smoking Bans and Smoking Behavior, 30 J. HEALTH ECON. 591
(2011) (finding that public smoking bans reduce the incidence of the smoking habit among
some subpopulations in Germany).
25 See Shipan & Volden, supra n. 18. More specifically, diffusion refers to the idea that
the probability of a jurisdiction adopting a given policy increases as other jurisdictions
adopt the policy. See Allan M. Brandt, Difference and Diffusion: Cross-Cultural Perspectives on
the Rise of Anti-Tobacco Policies, in UNFILTERED 255-74 (Eric A. Feldman and Ronald Bayer,
eds., 2004); Theodore R. Marmor and Evan S. Lieberman, Tobacco Control in Comparative
20
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As smoking bans have spread, there has been increased debate over
their consequences. Proponents of bans believe that they contribute to the
declining rates of smoking, and point to evidence that bans have been
associated with health improvement.26 While some of the evidence is
contested, it is safe to say that the vast majority of public health analysts
support smoking bans.
Opponents, on the other hand, argue that bans interfere with
individual liberty and dispute the underlying science. Libertarians and
some smokers tend to view smoking bans as paternalistic regulations
interfering with liberty and market processes.27, A key issue has been the
nature and extent of the externalities associated with smoking. Ban
proponents have had great success in exploiting the issue of second-hand
smoke. They have framed the issue using the language of rights, arguing
that smokers’ rights end at the nose of non-smokers. Smoking bans are
needed, it is argued, to protect the employees of restaurants and bars who
have no choice but to be exposed. The argument has had a powerful effect
in changing public attitudes toward smoking bans,28 though it has some
weaknesses as we explain below.
Libertarians counter that the vast majority of negative health effects
associated with smoking are felt by the smoker herself, and the science on

Perspective, in UNFILTERED 275, 285-86 (Eric A. Feldman and Ronald Bayer, eds., 2004). The
effect has been observed in a wide variety of domestic and international settings. It may be
attributable to learning across jurisdictions, or changes in costs and benefits associated with
particular policies (for example, losing business to a neighboring jurisdiction that has
adopted a more desirable policy). See Zachary Elkins and Beth Simmons, On Waves, Clusters
and Diffusion: A Conceptual Framework, 598 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. SOC. SCI. 133 (2005)
(describing various channels of policy diffusion). In the case of smoking bans there also
appear to be direct international pressures as work as well. Brandt, id., at 270 (international
enforcement).
26 For example, a study in Pueblo, Colorado, showed that incidence of acute myocardial
infraction declined after a smoking ban was adopted within the city limits. Carl Bartecchi, et
al. Reduction in the Incidence of Acute Myocardial Infarction Associated With a Citywide Smoking
Ordinance, 114 CIRCULATION 1490 (2006).
27 See Lambert, supra note 8, (arguing against smoking bans); Eric A. Feldman and
Ronald Bayer, Introduction, in UNFILTERED 6-7 (Eric A. Feldman and Ronald Bayer, eds.,
2004) (describing the libertarian objections).
28 Eric A. Feldman and Ronald Bayer, Conclusion, in UNFILTERED 292, 292 (Eric A.
Feldman and Ronald Bayer, eds., 2004) (“The identification of vulnerable third parties held
to be in need of protection has been a crucial justification for anti-tobacco-policy and
advocacy.”)
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second-hand effects is much weaker.29 Their view is that the “regulation of
cigarette use has far outstripped scientific concerns about risk to others.”30
They also raise the idea of a slippery slope. If one can justify paternalistic
policies by the simple fact that they may save lives, then government can
prohibit any risky activity that people freely choose – mountain climbing,
playing football, eating fatty foods, working in an underground mine, or
being a couch potato – all at the expense of liberty.
More relevant for our purposes is a second point. Even assuming
second-hand smoke is dangerous, if people are fully informed, they will
efficiently sort themselves by their preferences. In the absence of
transactions costs, of course, the Coase Theorem implies that voluntary
exchange produces an efficient outcome.31 There always are transactions
costs, but if they are low, the standard argument is that voluntary exchange
allows an outcome closer to efficiency than an outcome imposed by
government. First, employees who dislike smoking will demand a wage
premium to work in a smoking establishment, as the economic evidence
shows they do in other industries.32 Working in a smoking establishment is
like working in high rise construction or a nuclear power plant; one must
be paid extra in return for the health risks one accepts. Second, consumers
who dislike smoking will patronize non-smoking bars or other
establishments. Smoking-averse consumers will presumably require some

JOSEPH L. BEST, Why Defend Smokers? in PLEASE DON’T POOP IN MY SALAD AND OTHER
ESSAYS 3, 5-6 (The Heartland Inst., 2006); JOSEPH L. BEST, Leave Those Poor Smokers Alone!, in
PLEASE DON’T POOP IN MY SALAD AND OTHER ESSAYS 11, 12-13 (The Heartland Inst., 2006).
30 Brandt supra note 25, at 261.
31 See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & Econ. 1 (1960). The article
states no formal theorem but the modern understanding is that it proposes that, “when
transaction costs are zero, an efficient result will be reached, regardless of the initial
assignment of legal entitlements.” Lee Anne Fennell, Resource Access Costs, forthcoming 126
HARV. L. REV. (2013).
32 See Lambert, supra note 8, at 35-36 (“[E]mployers do in fact pay a premium for
exposing their workers to risks [such as secondhand smoking] . . . .”); Robert D. Tollison &
Richard E. Wagner, The Economics of Smoking 138 (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992)
(describing the process by which nonsmokers demand wage premiums). See generally W.
Kip Viscusi, Risk by Choice: Regulating Health and Safety in the Workplace 37-58 (1983)
(discussing compensating wage differentials by which employees in riskier jobs are paid
more); W. Kip Viscusi & Joseph E. Aldy, The Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical Review of
Market Estimates throughout the World, 27 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5 (2003) (reviewing the
accumulated literature on compensating wage differentials for risk).
29
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compensation for patronizing a smoking establishment, such as better
prices or superior service.
The argument works best in competitive markets such as motels,
restaurants, and bars. It works less well for less competitive facilities such
as airports and stadia, which often form local monopolies. With
competition, the standard prediction is that the market will eventually
produce a range of smoking policies to reflect consumer tastes. Left alone,
establishments might eventually innovate by using sophisticated filtering
technology to create separate spaces for each type or by charging
customers for smoking (passing savings on to non-smokers by charging
less for other goods and services). Non-smokers who care strongly about
avoiding exposure to second-hand smoke will find restaurants and bars
that cater to their preferences. Smokers who care strongly about smoking
in a particular establishment will find the same. We observe this kind of
differentiation in hotel rooms, where hotels reserve some rooms for nonsmokers and some hotels choose to be entirely smoke free.33 There was not
much evidence of non-smoking bars or restaurants before the bans went
into effect, but arguably that kind of specialization would have occurred on
its own, in response to changing preferences, had the law not intervened.
Thus, the libertarian argument against a smoking ban is that, if
establishments are free to decide whether to permit smoking, competitive
markets supply the one and only distribution of smoking and non-smoking
establishments that is consistent with consumer preferences and budgets.
Note that this efficiency argument is abstract and structural. There is no
effort to estimate each of the many costs and benefits of the pre-ban
smoking equilibrium and then to compare them to the costs and benefits of
a different outcome the law imposes. Instead, the claim is that the pre-ban
outcome is most likely to be efficient, given that the structure of competitive
markets and free exchange produces the optimal outcome.34

33

See, e.g, Millennium Knickerbocker Hotel Chicago, MILLENNIUM HOTELS & RESORTS,

http://www.millenniumhotels.com/millenniumchicago/hotel-amenities/guest-services.html
(100% non-smoking hotel).
34 Cf. Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach
to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643 (1996) (describing a structural
argument for courts to use in identifying whether business customs are likely to be efficient
and worthy of enforcement).
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The libertarian critic can go one step further. The argument so far
has been about simple efficiency – the maximization of wealth. Yet, in this
context, it is plausible that free market exchange not only maximizes
wealth, but also welfare. A social welfare function can be sensitive to
distribution,35 yet non-smokers in the United States (at least) tend to be
more affluent than smokers.36 The implications are significant and easily
overlooked. One cannot explain the fact that establishments
overwhelmingly permit smoking (before a ban) by the relative wealth of
smokers. Instead, the fact that many establishments chose to permit
smoking implies that the poorer smokers outbid the wealthier nonsmokers only because the former’s preferences for smoking are more
intense than the latter’s aversion to smoking (even considering the latter’s
concern about their own health). Distributional concerns are ordinarily
thought to justify laws that promote the welfare of the less-well-off at the
expense of the more-well-off, not the other way around. There are, of
course, paternalistic arguments that the smokers are making an error about
their own interests (or that satisfaction of uninformed preferences do not
count in the social welfare function37), but the goal of this article is to
illustrate a different critique, one that avoids this maximally paternalistic
move.
Figure 1 illustrates the libertarian analysis. In this context, an
equilibrium refers to a percentage of smoking and non-smoking
establishments (restaurants, bars, motels, etc.) that is stable because no
establishment gains by switching by itself from its current state (smoking
or non-smoking) to the opposite state. The x-axis is the percentage of
establishments of this type (restaurants, bars, casinos, etc.) that permit
smoking. The y-axis is the net revenue of an establishment. The gray line
See, e.g., MATTHEW D. ADLER, WELL-BEING AND FAIR DISTRIBUTION: BEYOND COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS (2012) (arguing for a continuous prioritarianism that gives additional
weight to the welfare of the least well off); LEWIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS
VERSUS WELFARE (2006) (noting that a social welfare function need not be utilitarian but can
give weight to equality of welfare).
36 Phillip B. Levine et. al., More Bad News for Smokers? The Effects of Cigarette Smoking on
Wages, 50 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 493, 495, 508 (1997) (noting educational level disparities
between smokers and nonsmokers; showing smoker and nonsmoker wage differences).
37 See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When
Preferences Are Distorted, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1105 (2000) (defending a welfarist cost-benefit
analysis that values the satisfaction of undistorted rather than actual preferences, as by
imagining what preferences would be if individuals were fully informed).
35
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shows the revenue from operating an establishment that permits smoking,
which varies with the percentage of all establishments of the same type
that permit smoking. At the left, there are no other smoking
establishments, so the revenue for being the one smoking establishment is
high. At the far right, with the maximum number of smoking competitors,
revenue is at its lowest. The curve might be drawn to decline continuously
or, as here, to have a flat middle segment where the revenues for one
smoking establishment are insensitive to the number of other smoking
establishments.
The black curve shows the revenues for non-smoking
establishments of the same sort. The shape and relative location of the
curve reveals two assumptions. One is that, in this community, smokers
are willing to pay more for the opportunity to smoke in such
establishments that non-smokers are willing to pay for the opportunity to
be in a smoke-free establishment. That is why the non-smoking revenue
curve is usually lower than the smoking revenue curve. Yet, second, there
comes a point where the percentage of smoking establishments is so high,
that there is a niche non-smoking market where the remaining
establishments earn more net revenue by attracting a large percentage of
the non-smokers.
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Figure 1: A Single Equilibrium of Smoking Establishments

Non-smoking
Establishment

Smoking
Establishment

PERCENTAGE OF ESTABLISHMENTS PERMITTING SMOKING

Where these curves intersect, the revenue from operating a
smoking establishment is equal to the revenue from operating a nonsmoking establishment. This point is an equilibrium because, from there,
no smoking establishment can gain by switching to non-smoking and no
non-smoking bar can gain by switching to smoking. From this point, if a
smoking establishment became non-smoking, its choice would cause a
decline in the percentage of establishments permitting smoking and
therefore its revenue is represented by a point to the left of the intersection
along the black line. That part of the line is below the intersection, meaning
the establishment would lose money by switching to non-smoking. A
similar point is true of a non-smoking establishment that changes to
smoking: the increase in the percentage of smoking establishments means
that its revenue is represented by a point to the right of the intersection
along the gray curve. That too is a move downward from the intersection,
representing a loss in revenues.
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The intersection is the only equilibrium because, at every other
point along the x-axis, some establishment wants to switch its smoking
policy. To the left of the equilibrium, there is always room for some
establishment to increase revenue by switching from non-smoking to
smoking. To the right of the equilibrium, there is always room for some
establishment to increase revenue by switching from smoking to nonsmoking. As drawn, Figure 1 shows an equilibrium with a relatively high
percentage of smoking establishments (more than 80%). The structural
argument for the efficiency of this outcome is that it is the only possible
product of free exchange.

B.

The Path Dependence Critique of the Libertarian Argument

From an economic perspective, the libertarian is almost certainly
correct in saying that the optimal amount of smoking establishments in any
community is greater than zero. We might say the same about any risky
activity that adults choose to engage in. There are health costs to skydiving,
boxing, driving in bad weather, eating cheeseburgers, and working high
rise construction, but for some individuals the benefits outweigh those
costs.
Yet it is quite possible that the libertarian is wrong about the status
quo representing the only equilibrium. Instead, there are many reasons to
expect path dependence, which complicates the case for efficiency. The
multiple equilibrium argument says that the equilibrium we observed
before smoking bans went into effect was not unique to that legal regime.
Instead, it was influenced by the starting point: high rates of smoking, little
concern about the health hazards of second-hand smoke, and a social norm
of deferring to smokers. Had we instead started from a low rate of
smoking, strong concerns about passive smoking health hazards, and a
norm of deferring to non-smokers, we might have reached a different
equilibrium, with more non-smoking establishments. Importantly, the
argument assumes we are holding constant preferences about smoking.
The multiple equilibrium argument is that those preferences can produce
different equilibrium behaviors. There is therefore no reason to assume
that the one we observe is efficient.
Figure 2 illustrates. As before, the curves represent the net revenue
from operating a smoking or non-smoking establishment, which varies by

19

the percentage of other establishments that are smoking. The revenue
curves here, however, cross not once but three times. The intersection on
the left is a low-smoking equilibrium (LSE); the intersection on the right is
a high-smoking equilibrium (HSE); the middle intersection is not an
equilibrium.
Figure 2: Multiple Equilibria of Smoking Establishments

Non-smoking
Establishment

Smoking
Establishment

PERCENTAGE OF ESTABLISHMENTS PERMITTING SMOKING
First, let us verify that the intersections on the left and right are in
fact equilibria. The LSE on the left is an equilibrium because, at this point,
no smoking establishment can gain by switching to non-smoking and no
non-smoking bar can gain by switching to smoking. If a smoking
establishment became non-smoking, its choice would cause a decline in the
percentage of establishments permitting smoking and therefore its revenue
is represented by a point to the left of the intersection along the black line.
The line is falling at that point, so the switch causes revenue to decline. If a
non-smoking establishment switched to smoking, it would move to the
right on the gray line, which also lowers revenue. For the same reason, the
HSE on the right is an equilibrium.
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Now consider why no other point on the graph is an equilibrium. At
any point on the x-axis where one revenue curve is higher than the other,
firms on the lower curve want to switch their smoking policy in order to
increase their revenues. To the left of the LSE, the revenue of smoking
establishments is higher, so some establishments want to shift to smoking.
To the right of the HSE, the opposite is true – non-smoking revenue is
higher and some establishments want to shift to non-smoking.
What about that third intersection, the one in the middle? For
convenience, we will refer to this intersection as an “inflection point” (even
though there is more than one inflection point in Figure 2).38 This point
lacks the stability of an equilibrium because any move away from it
increases revenue: a switch to smoking moves to the right on the gray
curve, which is an upward move; a switch to non-smoking moves to the
left and up on the black curve. The significance of the inflection point is
that it represents the border between the attractive forces of the two
equilibria. If the initial distribution of establishments is to the left of the
inflection point, firms gain from switching to non-smoking and the
establishment owners will switch smoking policies until they reach the
LSE. If the initial distribution is to the right of the inflection point, the
establishments move to the HSE. (At the inflection point, either move is
equally possible).
Note the resulting path dependency. If the distribution of
establishments begins just slightly to the left of the inflection point, the
result is the LSE. If the initial distribution is just slightly to the right of the
inflection point, the result is the HSE. Where we end up depends on arbitrary
differences in where we start. Yet if free exchange produces both the LSE and
HSE, then we can no longer rely on the structural argument for efficiency.
That the status quo is the product of free exchange is no longer evidence of
its efficiency, given that there is a very different outcome that free
exchange could just as easily produce, given an arbitrarily different
starting point.
The fact that the LSE exists also does not prove it is efficient. To
choose between the two equilibria requires some independent normative
evaluation. But note that the existence of multiple equilibria invalidates the
structural argument for the efficiency of the current outcome because we

38 This is not necessarily the precise mathematical usage, but it captures the idea. One
might also call this intersection the “tipping point.”

21

cannot say the current level of smoking-permitted establishments is the
necessary outcome of individuals freely pursuing their own ends. Instead,
those preferences and opportunities are consistent with more than one
behavioral outcome. Because we happened to start out at a high smoking
rate and higher tolerance rate for smoking, we end up with something
close to that.
Once there is no structural reason to favor the HSE, it is easy to
imagine a series of normative arguments for the LSE. Perhaps the
internalization of smoking externalities is never perfect, as some smoke
escapes the confines of one space into an adjoining “no-smoking” place,
where people have not consented to being exposed. If so, there is less such
“leakage” with a LSE than a HSE. Perhaps the LSE causes more smokers to
voluntarily quit,39 which desirably reduces externalities a competitive
market doesn’t address, such as the littering of discarded butts, the spread
of fires caused by smoking, or the choice of parents to smoke around their
children. There might be no economic efficiency or welfare basis for
choosing between the two equilibria, in which case it is difficult to object to
using some other criteria at least as a tie-breaker, and that non-economic
criteria might favor the LSE. Maybe Aristotelian virtue ethics or the
capabilities approach opposes any consumption that approaches or
constitutes an addiction, regardless of other consequences.40 This article is
not attempting to contribute to any such normative analysis, but only to
note that once there are multiple equilibria, there could be good normative
reasons to prefer some outcome other than the status quo.
Thus, if the LSE is superior to the HSE, note the implications for
law. First, as observed in the introduction, if we had enough information to
identify the location of the LSE, we could use law to reach it directing by
licensing the number of smoking establishments the LSE represents. We
can now add a similar observation about the inflection point. If we have
enough information to identify the location of this dividing line, we would
not need to know where the LSE is in order to ensure its emergence. As
long as the law drives the percentage of smoking establishments down to a

See Hersch, supra note 24; Anger, Kvasnicka, & Siedler, supra note 24.
See, e.g., VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE (Colin Farrelly & Lawrence Solum, eds., 2008) (a
collection of essays on aretaic theories of law); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH (Cambridge 2000) (articulating and defending
the promotion of human capabilities as a theory of distributive justice).
39
40
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level below (to the left of) the inflection point, more establishments will
choose to disallow smoking until the percentage reaches the LSE.
Yet if we do not know with confidence where the LSE or the
inflection point is, then a permanent law may misfire. One risk is that the
government licenses too many smoking establishments, at some level to
the right of the inflection point (but to the left of the HSE). The law thus
seeks to impose a non-equilibrium number of smoking establishments by
prohibiting smoking in establishments that lack a license. There are two
costs. First, we never reach the LSE.. We permanently enshrine a number of
smoking establishments that is higher (or lower) than optimal. Second, to
impose a non-equilibrium outcome requires enforcement and incurs the
associated costs. At any point to the right of the inflection point, but left of
the HSE, there are non-smoking establishments that would gain revenue
by allowing smoking, so those without licenses will have a constant
incentive to violate the smoking ban. The costs of constant enforcement
might make this scheme worse than simply allowing the HSE, which
involves no enforcement costs.
The parallel risk to permanent law is that the government licenses
too few smoking establishments, at some level to the left of the LSE. Again,
by permanently enforcing a below optimal smoking level, society must
incur two costs. One is inefficiency of frustrating stronger preferences for
smoking (as well as the distribution of wealth away from poorer smokers).
The other cost is enforcement, since at any point to the left of the LSE, there
are non-smoking establishments that would gain by allowing smoking, so
those without licenses have a constant incentive to violate the ban.
As a result, there are key advantages to giving a smoking law an
expiration date. One is equilibrium location. Once the law expires,
establishments will switch to smoking up to the LSE but not beyond it. A
second advantage is reduced enforcement costs because the LSE is selfsustaining; at this point, no establishment owner gains from switching to a
policy allowing smoking.. So we save on enforcement costs and we gain
whatever normative advantage the LSE might have over the HSE.
Temporality also offers equilibrium verification. There is always
some chance that we have made a fundamental mistake because our
information is erroneous and there is no LSE. If the economic libertarian is
correct and the HSE is the only and efficient equilibrium, then when the
law expires the establishments will switch back to smoking up to the level
of the HSE. We have then avoided the costs of erroneously using law to
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impose an inefficient outcome. Indeed, when we said above that we might
not know where the LSE or inflection point is, this includes the case where
we are confident where the LSE or inflection point would be if they exist,
but there is some possibility that they do not exist. The expiration of the
law completes the experiment that reveals whether the LSE exists and, if
so, where it is located.
Now we turn to the question we have postponed: why would there
ever be path dependency and multiple smoking equilibria?
C.

Rational and Behavioral Mechanisms Creating Path Dependence

We do not claim to offer all the reasons for multiple equilibria in the
number of smoking/non-smoking establishment. We only wish to illustrate
the plausibility of the argument so we can then show the virtue of a merely
temporary law. We divide our discussion into rational choice explanations
and behavioral explanations for path dependence. We focus on the
example of bars, but most of the points we make could apply to
apartments, restaurants, theatres, or other venues. Smoking bans are an
obvious example because, until recently, nearly every legal jurisdiction
allowed smoking in bars,41 and more importantly none had previously
banned smoking.42
1. Rational Choice Mechanisms for Path Dependence in the Number of
Smoking Establishments
If individuals are rational, why would path dependency occur? A
mundane story is the transition cost involved in switching smoking
policies. When a bar goes from smoking to non-smoking, the owner must
put up signs, create an outdoor space for smokers, and train the staff while
replacing staff members who quit on account of the new rules. The owner
might also have to spend money advertising for new customers. The
immediate costs of switching might exceed the discounted stream of higher
41

Patrick Kabat, "Till Naught but Ash Is Left to See": Statewide Smoking Bans, Ballot
Initiatives, and the Public Sphere, 9 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICS 128, 133-36 (2009)
(describing the emergence and proliferation of smoking bans).
42 Id. at 133 (“Arizona passed the first statewide [secondhand smoking] legislation in
1973, banning smoking in all indoor theaters, art museums, libraries, elevators, and buses
used by the public.”).
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revenue from switching. For that reason, the switch is not efficient, even if,
absent switching costs, the bar would generate more social welfare by
being non-smoking. For the rest of our examples, a switch might be
efficient.
Of greater interest are network effects.43 The story here has to be
that for one establishment, adopting a non-smoking policy alone will cause
it to lose more customers than it gains, even though if a group of
establishments adopted the policy at the same time they would gain more
customers than they lost. But why might it be true that the marginal
smoking bar would not gain from going non-smoking if there is an
equilibrium with many more non-smoking bars?
There are two kinds of social interdependencies that render this
outcome plausible. First is the lumpiness of consumption represented by
bar-hopping.44 Suppose there is a 20-something crowd that craves variety
and therefore enjoys starting at one bar and moving through three or four
more over the course of night. Suppose also that there is currently only one
non-smoking bar in the geographic area with twenty bars. Finally, let us
suppose that one of the primary costs the non-smokers perceive from
patronizing the smoking bar is that the smoke exposure, by the end of the
night, causes their clothes and hair to smell badly.45 This is no small matter
if one’s coat or clothing requires dry cleaning. But imagine that the cost of
tobacco smoke exposure is not linear, but subject to a strong threshold
effect: after the first thirty minutes of exposure in a smoking bar, additional
minutes of exposure add almost nothing to the bad smell.
Now consider the effect of the Marginal Bar (the economist’s
favorite drinking establishment46) switching from smoking to nonsmoking. If a night of bar-hopping involves going to four or five bars, then
it will make no difference to non-smokers that the Marginal Bar becomes
For a review of the economic literature, see Farrell & Klemperer, supra note 7.
It is difficult to estimate how common bar-hopping or pub crawling is. There is a
Guinness World Record for it. See http://www.guinnessworldrecords.com/records3000/most-people-on-a-pub-crawl/
45 See David B. Ezra, Smoker Battery: An Antidote to Second-Hand Smoke, 63 S. CAL. L. REV.
1061, 1067-1068 (1990) (“The clothing of a person who is exposed to tobacco smoke for even
relatively short periods of time can absorb chemicals that produce a foul odor that will
accompany that person for the remainder of the day. The only cure is to launder the
clothing, shower, and wash the hair.”).
46
There is in fact a bar with this name located in Portugal. See
https://www.facebook.com/MarginalBar.
43
44
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non-smoking. Even if they patronize both of the two non-smoking bars,
they will go to two or three smoking bars and still come home with the bad
smell. Thus, the non-smoking feature attracts no more non-smoking barhoppers, but it does drive away all the smoking bar-hoppers. The Marginal
Bar would not want to make that switch by itself.
Nevertheless, there could also be a low-smoking equilibrium, one
with, say, ten (of the twenty) bars being non-smoking. With that many
non-smoking bars, the non-smokers could at the same time satisfy their
desire for bar- hopping and their desire to avoid the bad smell of smoke
exposure. Suppose the Marginal Bar is one of the ten non-smoking bars. If
it switches from non-smoking to smoking, it will gain just a few of the
smoking bar hoppers (now spread out over 11 bars), but lose all the nonsmoking bar hoppers. The Marginal Bar would not want to make that
switch by itself.47
Now consider a second network effects story: social sorting.
Imagine that people go to only one bar per night, but that they go with or
meet up with a group of friends and acquaintances, perhaps from work.
When nineteen of the twenty bars are smoking, the groups that form
contain smokers and non-smokers. There being so few options for nonsmoking bars, the non-smokers feel it would be too demanding to ask
everyone to meet at that one non-smoking bar and therefore the smokers
always select a smoking bar. The Marginal Bar realizes that nothing
significant will change if it becomes the second non-smoking bar. The nonsmokers will still feel that there are so few choices of non-smoking bars
that it would be unreasonable to insist on going to one of them. The
Marginal Bar will therefore not make the change by itself.
Nonetheless, there could be a low-smoking equilibrium where ten
of the twenty bars are non-smoking. With half the bars non-smoking,
requesting to meet at a non-smoking bar is no more restraining than
requesting to meet at a smoking bar. Thus, the non-smokers will speak up.

If transactions costs were sufficiently low, a group of bars might contract with each
other to jointly switch to non-smoking. But various transactions costs might block this
solution. First, there are costs of coordinating among the different owners and each owner
might seek to avoid these costs by waiting for another owner to take the lead in
coordinating them. Second, the bar owners might themselves lack the information to know
the location of the other equilibrium, that is, how many bars need to jointly switch to
achieve the joint gains. Third, there could be concerns about antitrust liability from
competitors agreeing jointly to the terms offered to customers.
47
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There are three ways the low-smoking equilibrium might then be stable.
One is that the group bargains over what kind of bar to patronize and the
non-smoking bar wins a substantial fraction of the time. Perhaps the group
alternates evenly between the smoking and non-smoking bars. We have
said nothing up to this point about what proportion of the group is nonsmoking. But we might think that if the majority of the group is nonsmoking, then it will patronize non-smoking bars most or all of the time. A
second possibility is that the group breaks up. Now that there is substantial
choice, the difference between smokers and non-smokers is sufficient to
cause the work groups to form around that choice. The non-smokers now
always patronize non-smoking bars. If we allow even more endogeneity,
we arrive at a third possibility: some of the smokers find that the
inconvenience of exiting the group or suffering in a non-smoking bar is
sufficient to cause them to quit smoking.48 This point reinforces the first
two – increasing the bargaining power of the non-smokers to either spend
more time in the non-smoking bar or to stop inviting smokers to join them.
There might be other network effect mechanisms as well, such as
the effects of such policies on the labor supply of bartenders and other bar
employees. A non-smoking policy is costly for employees who smoke.
Most obviously, some non-smoking policies require employees to exit the
building to smoke rather than to smoke in a designated room (out of fear
that air circulation will then drive away non-smoking customers).
Requiring employees to smoke outside imposes costs when the weather is
unpleasant or when the nearest smoking spot is next to the garbage bin or
in a poorly lit alley. Even if the non-smoking establishment allows smoking
employees to smoke inside, they may impose limits on where the smoking
may occur, perhaps limited to time in the break room, rather than allowing
a waiter or bartender to keep a lit cigarette in an ashtray accessible to the
workspace.
Now consider how employees will sort themselves. If we start with
all bars allowing smoking, then employee smokers will have no reason to
avoid working at bars. By contrast, nonsmoker workers will
disproportionately sort themselves into jobs other than bars. The nonsmoker who works in his own home need not be exposed to smoke. One
who works outside as a gardener, door-to-door salesperson, or sidewalk
vendor will not have to worry about intense exposure. One who drives a
48

See Hersch, supra note 24; Anger, Kvasnicka, & Siedler, supra note 24.
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cab can usually decide to forbid smoking in the cab. And almost any
factory or office building will have less intense buildup of smoke than a
bar, pool hall, or dance club. The point is that, when all establishments
permit smoking, the non-smokers will not be spread evenly but will be
concentrated in those industries with less intense smoke exposure.
Suppose also that the labor supply is “sticky” in the short run
because those who are already have a job working in a bar have lower
search costs for other bar jobs than those who are currently working in
another occupation. That is not to say that the labor market for bar workers
is fixed; some people might move from non-bar jobs to bar jobs. But given
two workers of equal marginal productivity at serving alcohol, the one
already employed in this occupation is more likely to apply for desirable
positions in the occupation. This might be true for various reasons, the
simplest being information: those working in other occupations are less
likely to have the information about the best available bar jobs, so that they
are less likely to apply. Another is human capital investments: when all or
most bars are smoking, the people who take bar-tending classes (learning
to mix drinks) are more likely to be smokers.
Finally, assume that a bar experiences lower wage costs the larger
the pool of potential applicants for an offered job. If there are five
applicants for every job, instead of two, the employer will either be able to
pay a lower wage or to hire a more productive worker.
Given these points, there will be network effects. If almost all bars
are smoking, employee selection means that the average bar will have lots
of smoking employees and, when there is turnover, will be able to draw on
a labor pool that has many smokers (in both cases, compared to the
percentage of smokers in the general working population). If all the bars
are non-smoking, selection works the opposite way so that the average bar
will have relatively more non-smoking employees and job applicants. In
either case, the effect in the short run is to raise the labor costs of operating
against the industry standard. With all smoking bars, if the Marginal Bar
switches to non-smoking, it will not only incur switching costs, it will draw
on a smaller pool of potential employees than its competitors, which will
raise its labor costs. With all non-smoking bars, if the Marginal Bar
switches to smoking, it will incur higher employee costs than its
competitors.
In short, it is not difficult to imagine network effects affect the
decisions of bar owners regarding smoking policies. The result is multiple
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equilibria, with path dependency affecting the equilibrium that actually
emerges.
2. Behavioral Mechanisms for Path Dependence in the Number of
Smoking Establishments
Now we turn from network externalities to behavioral biases. We
consider biases that might affect three different groups: bar owners,
employees, and customers.
When a bar owner is considering whether to switch from allowing
smoking to prohibiting it (or the reverse), that owner will necessarily
weigh the current customers she will lose if she switches against the
hypothetical future customers she might gain. However, as noted above,
the bar owner will likely suffer from the availability heuristic.49 The
customers that will be lost are psychologically available because they are
being current customers—the bar owner sees them and may even know
them personally. The customers who might be gained from the switch are
not available; by definition, they never (or rarely) set foot in the bar. The
availability heuristic is the tendency to overestimate the numbers of things
(or people) that are psychologically available and underestimate the
numbers of things that are not.50 So bar owners will likely overestimate the
number of customers they will lose from switching and underestimate the
number of customers they might gain. As with most biases, changing the
status quo would reverse the direction of the bias. If a bar were already
non-smoking, current (non-smoking) customers would be more available
than potential smoking customers, and bar owners would overestimate the
costs of switching to allow smoking.
The same effect might be triggered by risk aversion or loss aversion,
which is the tendency to fear losses more than one values gains.51
Switching from permitting to prohibiting smoking would involve possible
gains and losses of customers, and a typical bar owner would likely fear
losing current customers more than she would value the prospect of
49

See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency
and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 230 (1973) (describing the availability heuristic).
50 Id. (explaining how the availability heuristic can arise)
51 Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Endowment
Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 193 (1991) (describing the
endowment effect and loss aversion).

29

gaining additional ones. But once a bar has become non-smoking, the
owner would view a switch back to allowing smoking as bringing possible
losses to which she is again averse.52
Present bias or hyperbolic discounting on the part of a bar owner
could equally cause a stable but suboptimal equilibrium to develop. Recall
that there are immediate costs in switching from smoking to non-smoking,
even if there are eventual net gains. A bar owner might want to put up
signs, create an outdoor space for smokers, spend money advertising for
new non-smoking customers, and retrain new employees as smoking
employees quit in anticipation of the new rule. A large economic literature
shows that, when faced with decisions of this structure, with immediate
costs and future benefits, many people procrastinate.53 That is, even though
the benefits discounted by their ordinary discount rate (the one they use
when comparing the costs or benefits of two future events) exceed the
costs, the immediate costs loom larger, as the future was discounted at an
inconsistently high rate when compared to an immediate cost. As a result,
bar owners keep delaying the costly investment, even though they will not
regret the investment if they make it. If an owner is “present biased” in this
sense, he or she may for a fail to invest in a profitable switch to nonsmoking status, but will not switch back once the investment is made.
Finally, a bar owner might also fall prey to the sunk cost fallacy: the
desire not to “waste” resources that have already been spent even if it

Deborah A. Kermer et al., Loss Aversion Is an Affective Forecasting Error, 17 PSYCH. SCI.
649, 652 (2006) (positing a mechanism for loss aversion).
53 See, e.g., Shane Frederick et al., Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review,
40 J. ECON. LIT. 351 (2002) (reviewing the economic literature on self-control problems);
David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J. ECON. 443 (1997) (modeling
time-inconsistent preferences and imperfect financial self-control technologies); Ted
O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Doing It Now or Later, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 103 (1999)
(modeling time-inconsistent, present-biased preferences, with people who are aware or
unaware of their bias). For discussions of how bounded self-control matters to law, see Lee
Anne Fennell, Willpower and Legal Policy, 5 ANN. REV. LAW & SOC. SCI. 91 (2009) (reviewing
the economic literature and its significance for law); Richard H. McAdams, Present Bias and
Criminal Law, 2011 ILL. LAW REV. 1607 (examining the relevance of present-bias to the
structure of criminal law and sanctions); Manuel A. Utset, Procrastination and the Law, in The
THIEF OF TIME: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON PROCRASTINATION 253 (Chrisoula Andreou & Mark
D. White eds., 2010) (identifying how law can aid or impede the self-control efforts of
present-biased individuals).
52

30

would be in the individual’s interests to do so.54 For instance, a bar owner
might have made smoking-specific investments, such as installing a highquality ventilation system or purchasing ashtrays or a cigarette vending
machine. Going smoke-free would mean wasting these resources. This is
yet another mechanism by which a bar owner can become tied to the status
quo long past the point at which it ceases to be to her advantage.
Employees might also suffer from relevant cognitive biases.
Perhaps most important is the endowment effect, which is the human
tendency to overvalue the things (including rights and privileges) that one
already possesses.55
When an employee can smoke at work, the
entitlement to smoke seems more valuable than it would if the employee
were not allowed to smoke at work. This will cause smokers to care a great
deal if their workplaces transition from smoking to smoke-free—more than
they would care about transitions in the opposite direction, in which nonsmoking workplaces (where workers are not already “endowed” with the
right to smoke) begin to allow smoking. The reverse is also true. Nonsmokers would place a higher value on holding onto a smoke-free
workplace than transitioning from a smoking workplace to a smoke-free
one. This means that workers will fight harder to hold onto whatever
arrangement is currently in place. Employers who switch from smoking to
non-smoking or the reverse will incur significant costs, either losing
employees or being forced to compensate them for the change. The result
will be to entrench the status quo.
Lastly, customers might also be subject to cognitive biases that
would serve to entrench a suboptimal equilibrium. Consider first the
problem of affective forecasting. Humans have notorious difficulty at
predicting how they much they will enjoy a given experience or
circumstance.56 Imagine then that we are in a high-smoking equilibrium,
See Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, The Myth of the Rational Borrower:
Rationality, Behavioralism, and the Misguided “Reform” of Bankruptcy Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1481,
1534 (2006) (“Cognitive research also finds that individuals are reluctant to walk away from
sunk costs, irrationally ignoring the marginal costs and benefits of additional action.”).
55 See Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status
Quo Bias , 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 197-99 (1991) (describing and identifying the endowment
effect).
56 See Timothy D. Wilson & Daniel T. Gilbert, Affective Forecasting: Knowing What to
Want, 14 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 131, 131 (2005) (“Research on affective
forecasting has shown that people routinely mispredict how much pleasure or displeasure
future events will bring and, as a result, sometimes work to bring about events that do not
54

31

with nearly 100% of bars permitting smoking. Non-smokers might not
realize how much they would enjoy going to smoke-free bars. As a result,
they might not agitate for non-smoking bars either publicly—by asking bar
owners to ban smoking—or privately, by urging their friends to join them
at the few non-smoking bars. Bar owners will thus perceive the benefits of
switching to be lower than they actually are.
Similarly, humans have a remarkable capacity to adapt to new
circumstances and conditions, even highly unpleasant ones. Exposing an
individual to new circumstances might initially make her quite unhappy,
but over time new she might learn to accept or even prefer those
circumstances. Psychologists describe the process as “hedonic
adaptation.”57 The power of these psychological mechanisms to produce
multiple equilibria should be clear. In a high-smoking equilibrium, nonsmoking customers and employees could adapt to the presence of smoke.
This would dull or eliminate their desire to seek out non-smoking
alternatives, which would in turn diminish the incentives of business
owners to prohibit smoking. And the reverse is possible as well—smokers
in a low-smoking equilibrium might adapt to being unable to smoke.58
Adaptation could then serve to entrench whatever status quo is
generated by a temporary ban as well. If a jurisdiction enacts a temporary
smoking ban, non-smokers will have the opportunity to experience nonsmoking bars and might realize how much nicer it is to spend time in a
non-smoking establishment. Their adaptation to smokiness might
dissipate. The costs of accompanying their smoking friends to a smoking
bar would seem higher. Importantly, people often do not remember how

maximize their happiness.”); David A. Schkade & Daniel Kahneman, Does Living in
California Make People Happy? A Focusing Illusion in Judgments of Life Satisfaction, 9 PSYCHOL.
SCI. 340, 344–45 (1998) (discussing affective forecasting errors).
57 For an excellent summary of the initial research on hedonic adaptation, see Shane
Frederick & George Loewenstein, Hedonic Adaptation, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF
HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1999).
58 We hasten to add that if an equilibrium becomes entrenched because of hedonic
adaptation, this does not necessarily mean that the equilibrium is suboptimal. Adaptation
may represent a real welfare gain. See John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, and
Jonathan S. Masur, Welfare as Happiness, 98 GEO. L.J. 1583 (2010). Accordingly, a lowsmoking equilibrium to which smokers have adapted may be no worse off for the smokers
than a high-smoking equilibrium.
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quickly they were able to adapt in the past.59 Thus, the non-smokers might
not realize that they will again adapt to a smoke-filled environment. Once
the temporary ban lapses, these non-smokers might continue to prefer bars
that remain non-smoking, creating additional business for those bars and
incentives for them to continue to prohibit smoking. This could lead to a
new low-smoking equilibrium.
The final mechanism is the simplest: the ban reduces the number of
smokers. Over the long term, smoking rates in the United States are
declining. Smoking bans may accelerate that trend because the
inconvenience of not being able to smoke in a bar (or other establishment)
may cause individuals to quit smoking (or to quit more quickly). Indeed,
some smokers apparently support bans for this very reason, as a selfcommitment device for quitting (which makes sense if smokers are subject
to present-bias and otherwise procrastinate quitting). So if the ban lowers
the number of smokers, it may change the profit margins for being a nonsmoking establishment in a way that supports an equilibrium with more
such establishments after the ban lapses.
* * *
In sum, there are a great many reasons to expect multiple equilibria
in the proportion of establishments permitting smoking. Once they exist,
the conventional libertarian argument against smoking bans no longer
exists and there are plausible reasons to prefer a low-smoking over a highsmoking equilibrium. Yet this rationale supports only a temporary law,
which, given uncertainty, has certain informational advantages over a
permanent law. We now turn to a generalization of this analysis.

II. THE ADVANTAGES (AND DISADVANTAGES) OF TEMPORARY LAW
Now we generalize the smoking policy example. Temporary law is
a useful mechanism for discovering and unsettling suboptimal equilibria.
Temporary law provides a number of advantages over the alternative of
permanent law, which we now address: (1) possible efficiency gains based
on superior information; (2) greater accommodation of the demands for
Timothy D. Wilson, et al, Focalism: A Source of Durability Bias in Affective Forecasting, 78
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 821, 833 (2000) (describing adaptation and the human response
to it).
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liberty; and (3) a new space for political compromise of competing claims.
We also consider the potential costs associated with temporary law.
A.

Advantages
1. Efficiency (and Information)

The main advantage of temporary law is the discovery of a more
efficient equilibrium, if there is one. After the law expires, if the behavioral
equilibrium remains the same or substantially different than the status quo
ante, we have confirmed the existence of multiple equilibria. This is the
process we have termed equilibrium verification and location. Better
information allows efficiency gains when the new equilibrium is welfareenhancing. Alternatively, after the law expires, if the behavior reverts to
the original equilibrium, the legislative experiment reveals the case against
path dependence and any normative claim predicated on path
dependence.
Information. At the most basic level, any type of law can be
information-revealing.60 Before the law is enacted, there is uncertainty as to
what the effects of such a law would be.61 After the law has been passed,
policymakers can observe the new state of the world and determine the
law’s effects.62 In theory, after legalizing prostitution or the sale of heroin,
one can observe whether it causes the social ills associated with those

See Listokin, supra note 14, at 483 n.1(describing the information-revealing process of
policymaking as “learning”).
61 Id. (“Before implementing a policy, policymakers may have only a dim idea about the
effects of the policy.”).
62 Id. (“After implementing the policy and observing its effects, policymakers will often
have a much better sense of the outcomes associated with the policy in current and future
periods.”).
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activities to rise or fall.63 One can observe whether a minimum wage
increases unemployment, as some theory predicts.64
What is unique about temporary law, however, is the information
revealed not (or not only) by the laws enactment – its consequences when
the law is in effect – but the information revealed after the law lapses.
Policymakers and scholars generally assume that there is only one possible
equilibrium for each legal rule (with a given level of enforcement). When
this is the case, the expiration of a temporary law tends to return behavior
to the status quo ante, so that the expiration itself reveals no useful
information. Of course, Listokin directs our attention to the fact that some
of the law’s effects are irreversible, as the legalization of heroin might
create a new glut of addicts who do not immediately disappear when the
prohibition on heroin is reinstated.65 But even here, the purpose of repeal
is to stop the ill effects caused by the new law, which means to respond to
information produced by the enactment of the new law, not its expiration.
Yet things are different when there are multiple equilibria. If this is
the case, temporary law can allow the policymaker to observe the different
equilibria that applies to a single legal regime. If the legal rule allows
smoking in bars, there may be one equilibrium in which 100% of bars allow
smoking and another equilibrium in which only 50% of bars allow
See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Trafficking, Prostitution, and Inequality, 46 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 271 (2011) (expounding on the social ills associated with prostitution); see also
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Prostitution and Civil Rights, 1 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 13 (1993)
(“Women in prostitution are denied every imaginable civil right in every imaginable and
unimaginable way . . . .”). See generally John Kaplan, A Primer on Heroin, 27 STAN. L. REV. 801,
806-13 (1975) (describing heroin use and its effects).
64 Debra Burke et. al., Minimum Wage and Unemployment Rates: A Study of Contiguous
Counties, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 661, 675-76 (2011) (explaining the general theory that the
minimum wage may adversely affect employment); see also David Neumark & William
Wascher, Minimum Wages, Labor Market Institutions, and Youth Employment: A Cross-National
Analysis, 57 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 223 (2004) (providing evidence that the minimum wage
reduces employment rates among the youth population).
65 Listokin, supra note 14. Compare William Rhodes et. al., Illicit Drugs: Price Elasticity of
Demand and Supply 12-25, 89-92(Abt. Associates Inc., 2000) (collecting studies on price
elasticity of demand for illegal drugs; finding weak negative price elasticity for heroin), and
Michael Grossman et. al., The Demand for Cocaine by Young Adults: A Rational Addiction
Approach 1, 3-5 (NBER Working Paper Ser., Working Paper 5713, 1996) (collecting studies
reporting negative price elasticity of demand for illegal drugs, including heroin), with Mark
A. Deininger, The Economics of Heroin: Key to Optimizing the Legal Response, 10 GA. L. REV.
565, 586 (“Because the addict is willing to pay higher and higher prices for heroin, heroin
enterprise remains profitable despite increased criminalization.”).
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smoking. If the choice of equilibrium is path dependent, the equilibrium
that develops in response to a particular rule might depend not only upon
that legal rule, but in addition on the rule that preceded it. The unique
information temporary law reveals is what behavior results from the same
regulation with different initial states.
Temporary law could effectively reveal situations of multiple
equilibria caused by any of the mechanisms we described in Part I.
Consider first the rational choice mechanisms we describe. If an
equilibrium exists purely because of switching costs, temporary law will
reveal a different equilibrium by forcing individuals to bear those
switching costs (though as we noted, if the costs of switching exceed the
benefits, it is inefficient to switch). This is similarly true if the equilibrium
exists because of network effects. If, for instance, it is unprofitable for a
single bar to switch from smoking to non-smoking while other bars
continue to allow smoking, it may nonetheless be profitable for the bar to
remain non-smoking if all the other bars around it are similarly made nonsmoking by law.66
The same conclusion also applies to all of the behavioral
mechanisms we described. If an equilibrium holds because existing
customers are more available and salient than potential future customers,
temporarily changing the legal rule will bring these potential (now actual)
customers to the fore. They will become at least as salient, if not more
salient, than the customers who existed under the old legal regime. If the
equilibrium is being driven by loss aversion or risk aversion, temporary
law will simply force individuals and firms to accept the possibility of loss
or risk. They will then learn whether their aversion was justified.
Temporary law will overcome the sunk cost fallacy in similar fashion,
forcing individuals to make changes that the sunk cost fallacy might have
deterred. Temporary law also alters the status quo, disrupting biases that
depend on that status quo. If an equilibrium has become entrenched
because of the endowment effect, temporary law will adjust the entitlement
to which individuals (both consumers and producers) have become
accustomed. Finally, if a particular equilibrium is due to adaptation or
affective forecasting errors, temporary law will disrupt these mechanisms
as well. Individuals who have adapted to one state of the world will find
Cf. John H. Miller and Scott E. Page, COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS: AN INTRODUCTION
COMPUTATIONAL MODELS OF SOCIAL LIFE 17-20 (2007) (explaining how the choice of a new
status quo can reorganize individuals who are engaging in sorting).
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that status quo disrupted and be forced to adapt (or not) to another. And
individuals who feared moving from the status quo because they
incorrectly forecast that they will be less well off under a different set of
rules will be forced to experience that new set of rules. They will then learn
whether their forecast was correct and can adjust their beliefs if they were
mistaken.
We hasten to add that temporary law will not allow us to
distinguish between these network and behavioral mechanisms. If a
temporary smoking ban causes the vast majority of bars in a jurisdiction to
continue to prohibit smoking even after the ban is lifted, we cannot know
which of the equilibrium-entrenching mechanisms we describe was at
work. It is possible that many of them were operating in combination. This
information would certainly be valuable were it available, but it is not
essential before we can draw policy conclusions. If temporary law creates a
new (post-repeal) equilibrium that differs greatly from the status quo ante,
that indicates that the prior equilibrium was due to forces other than pure
market supply and demand. The case against regulation is thus
weakened.67
Before we proceed, it is important to distinguish the informational
benefits of temporary law from those of federalism. Federalism is often
described as information-producing because it allows a policymaker to test
one or more policies in smaller jurisdictions.68 State or local “laboratories”
allow experiments at lower risks than does national legislation. 69
Temporary law also constrains risk, but by parceling the new regulation
across a sub-unit of time rather than a sub-unit of space. Yet these two
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism is Not an
Oxymoron 3 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper No. 03-02,
2003) (“[T]he design features of both legal and organizational rules have surprisingly
powerful influences on the choices made by those affected.”).
68 Ann Althouse, Vanguard States, Laggard States: Federalism and Constitutional Rights, 152
U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1745-52 (2004) (“The most appealing reason for courts . . . to preserve the
role of autonomous states is the prediction that states will . . . experiment with new policies .
. . and produc[e] evidence about the effectiveness and workability of new programs, to be
followed . . . by the rest of the states, who can look upon one state's experiment and learn.”).
69 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country.”); see also Yair Listokin, Learning Through Policy
Variation, 118 YALE L.J. 480, 514 (2008) (describing how jurisdictions can observe others’
policy outcomes while avoiding the negative effects of failure).
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modes of diversifying regulatory risks are not substitutes. Federalism is not
a solution to problems of multiple equilibria. Local experiments with
permanent smoking bans do not reveal whether there was a low-smoking
equilibrium consistent with the rule permitting smoking. But federalism
and temporary law may be complementary. If a temporary law produces a
new equilibrium, it will always be possible that some exogenous factor—
for instance, the revelation of new information about the dangers of
smoking—were responsible, and the temporary law had little to do with it.
One way of disambiguating these possible effects is to experiment
(via Federalism) with temporary law in some jurisdictions but not others.
The proof of multiple equilibria in one jurisdiction may make it more
plausible (but not certain) that multiple equilibria exist in another
jurisdiction and that temporary law can be used to arrive at a different
equilibrium. By contrast, if the expiration of temporary law in one
jurisdiction results in restoration of the original equilibrium, the proof of a
single equilibrium in one jurisdiction may make it less plausible (but not
rule out with certainty) the presence of multiple equilibria in another
jurisdiction, decreasing the case for even temporary regulation.
Efficiency. Given more information, the efficiency advantage of a
temporary law is error correction. The rationale for the ban—multiple
equilibria—may be based on an error. If the law is effectively enforced, a
powerful type of evidence is the re-emergence of the original equilibrium
after the law expires. Temporary law thus allows error correction of poor
regulations, providing efficiency advantages.
If expiration of the law does not cause behavior to revert to the old
equilibrium, the move to the newly discovered equilibrium may be an
efficiency gain. As noted above, whether it is a gain depends on some
independent analysis, but the existence of the new equilibrium undermines
the structural argument for the efficiency of the original equilibrium.70
How might we determine which equilibrium, low-smoking or highsmoking, is superior? Some alternative mechanism, such as a version of
cost-benefit analysis, will be necessary.71 It is beyond the scope of this
paper to lay out an approach in full detail, but we will offer some
prudential guidance. First, we could measure the net revenues of bars and
See supra note 2-5 and accompanying text.
See generally John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, & Jonathan Masur, Well-Being
Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis, DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2013).
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restaurants at the old and new equilibria. If net revenues have increased
after the switch to the new equilibrium, this is evidence that both bar
owners and customers prefer the new equilibrium. Another means of
getting at the same question would be to measure the number of personhours spent in bars at the new and old equilibria. If bar customers were,
collectively, spending more time in bars at the new equilibrium, or if more
people were patronizing bars at that equilibrium, that too would be
evidence that the switch to the new equilibrium has increased welfare by
providing greater opportunities for bar-goers.
These may be difficult quantities to measure, but there is also a
potential shortcut. The goal in searching out a new equilibrium is to
provide a greater range of options to customers—that is, to better align
supply with demand. If customers have more options, it is more likely that
they will find a bar that meets their preferences and will patronize it.
Generally speaking, the more extreme the equilibrium, the fewer the
options available to customers. If 98% of all bars permit smoking, very few
customers will have a non-smoking bar available to them. If, on the other
hand, “only” 55% of bars allow smoking, many more potential patrons will
have both a smoking and a non-smoking bar in their vicinity. The
additional options will likely increase bar patronage. Accordingly, we can
tentatively conclude that an equilibrium in which the proportion of
smoking bars more closely matches the proportion of smokers in the
general population will likely be superior to one in which those
proportions differ more greatly. Or, more generally, the more
proportionately available the various options, the better.
This conclusion is only tentative because it might be that an activity
such as smoking is highly correlated with bar patronage. If this is the case,
then an equilibrium closer to the proportion of smokers in the general
population might leave the smoking bars overly crowded with patrons,
and some smokers will not have bars they can patronize because of
capacity constraints. This is an empirical question, and one that depends
upon whether bars have excess unused capacity. But the idea that a more
proportional equilibrium is likely to be superior is a useful rule of thumb,
even if it is only a rule of thumb.
Thus, temporary law is efficient when it appears that the status quo
is trapped in a suboptimal equilibrium (a superior equilibrium exists),
there are informational barriers to directly mandating the better
equilibrium (including uncertainty about whether it actually exists), and
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the costs of switching between equilibrium are low compared to the
efficiency gains.72 Suppose that a superior equilibrium exists with
probability p. Let B be the efficiency gain from this superior equilibrium
compared with the status quo. Let SC1 be the cost to individuals of
switching from the status quo to complying with a temporary law (for
example, a complete smoking ban). Let SC0 be the cost to individuals of
switching from the temporary legal regime back to the status quo, and SC2
the cost of switching from the temporary legal regime to a new equilibrium
(if one exists). Temporary law is justified if (and only if):
pB > SC1 + pSC2 + (1 – p)SC0
It is worth noting that a number of these terms are related. As B
increases, SC2 will decrease. The reason is that the more that the new
equilibrium diverges from the old equilibrium, and the more that it
resembles the temporary legal regime, the greater the efficiency benefits of
switching to it and the smaller the number of individuals who will have to
switch from the temporary legal regime. Similarly, as SC1 increases, B
increases as well. That is, if the temporary regime is very far from the
current equilibrium, switching costs will be higher but the potential
benefits from locating a new equilibrium could be higher as well.
Of course, we hasten to add that if we do not know where the
second equilibrium is located, or even whether that second equilibrium
exists, we cannot know B (the efficiency gain of reaching that equilibrium)
to any degree of certainty. This is one important sense in which the
advantages of temporary law arise only in the absence of first-best
information. The value of generating equilibrium verification and location
can only be obtained at the risk of B being small, and the game not worth
the candle. Accordingly, policymakers should only undertake experiments
with temporary law when they have some intuitive or empirical reason to
believe that p and B are relatively large and SC0-2 relatively small.

More precisely, we have to consider both the costs of the initial switch to the new
equilibrium the temporary law imposes and the probability of incurring the additional
switching costs, and their magnitude, if the original equilibrium re-emerges after the law
expires.
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2. Liberty
Liberal theory assumes as a default position that government
should not regulate in the absence of market failure.73 We have
hypothesized that there may be situations in which market failure
generates a socially suboptimal equilibrium when other, more efficient
equilibria are possible. As we have explained, one way to move to a more
efficient equilibrium is to simply impose a permanent regulation. But if we
are correct that the choice of market equilibrium is path dependent, then
permanent regulation might not be necessary. Policymakers could
accomplish the same (or better) ends by using a temporary law that simply
alters the legal path.
If temporality became a standard regulatory option, then those who
advocated a permanent ban would have to offer a rationale for restricting
liberty permanently. Temporary law also works against the general
ratcheting effect of increasing government regulation permeating ever
more aspects of human life.74 Because the law will expire on its own, it does
not require coordinated action on the part of the political branches to
return to the unregulated status quo. Those who favor liberty, either as an
instrumental or intrinsic good, should thus prefer temporary law to
permanent law. Repealing the regulation allows the idiosyncratic to revert
to their preferred behavior. Some or even most smokers may adjust to nosmoking bars, but those who do not can still find a bar to indulge their
preferences.
Nonetheless, we can certainly understand that libertarians might
perceive the idea of temporary law as a threat to liberty precisely because it
appears to lower the stakes. First, there might be some cases where the
politics of the situation would not support a permanent regulation, but will
support a temporary regulation (as discussed in the next section). Second,
there is some possibility that the supporters of the regulation will keep

Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation: A
Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 909, 911 (1994) (“The problem of market
failure provides the basic public-interest justification for the displacement of private
ordering by government intervention.”).
74 See Marci A. Hamilton, The Belief/Conduct Paradigm in the Supreme Court’s Free-Exercise
Jurisprudence: A Theological Account of the Failure to Protect Religious Conduct, 54 OHIO ST. L.J.
713, 715 (1993) (describing this ratchet effect).
73

41

gathering support to extend it, transforming a temporary regulation into a
de facto permanent one.75
We don’t entirely reject these concerns, but we note a few
responses. First, the logic we are proposing does not support the
continuous renewal of temporary regulations. The de facto permanency of
regulations undermines the credibility of the claim that the problem being
addressed is path dependency. Second, the implication of our theory is not
only the desirability of certain temporary regulations in the future, but also
the fact that some past regulations that were permanent should have been
temporary. Thus, the argument for temporary regulations supports the
repeal of some existing regulations. Most obviously, our argument implies
the desirability of eventually repealing many of the public smoking bans.
In the final section, we discuss seat belt laws as another possible example.
3. Politics
The final advantage is political: temporary regulation creates new
policy space for political bargains. Because the opponents of regulation will
understand that the status quo ante will return after the regulatory period
ends, they may be less resistant to explicitly temporary rules. Also, the
optimism bias works in favor of this compromise.76 Those favoring the
regulation can optimistically believe in their path dependency arguments,
therefore predicting that they will maintain a new equilibrium after the law
is repealed. Those opposed to the regulation can optimistically believe that
the status quo ante is the only equilibrium without a regulation, so it will
return once the temporary law expires. With more space for political
bargains, the stakes are lower, so there will be fewer resources wastefully
invested in the political competition.77
We note that temporary clauses are common in national and
subnational constitutions, where they are particularly useful as solutions to

See Emily Berman, The Paradox of Counterterrorism Sunset Provisions (unpublished
manuscript 2012).
76 See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1471, 1536-37 (1998) (describing the phenomenon of optimism bias).
77 Cf. John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, and Jonathan S. Masur, Hedonic
Adaptation and the Settlement of Civil Lawsuits, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1516, 1519-25 (2008)
(describing a bargaining model in which the addition of bargaining space increases the
likelihood of an agreement).
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bargaining problems. Many constitutional negotiations have the character
of bilateral monopoly, in which two parties have no alternative negotiating
partners but also have an incentive to hold out for a better deal. Temporary
provisions can facilitate needed institutional reforms or allow further
information to be revealed so that a bargain can be concluded at a later
date. Oftentimes the “temporary” legislation is actually a rule preventing
legislators from overturning a default clause for a limited period of time.
This is not precisely temporary legislation as we have defined it. But the
effect can similarly be one of revealing information and allowing
experiments.
B.

Costs

Temporary law also has some important disadvantages relative to
permanent law. These include duplicative switching costs, incurred when a
jurisdiction returns to the status quo ante, and lower quality law.
1. Duplicative Switching Costs
We anticipate the use of temporary law in situations in which we
are not confident that the status quo ante represents the only or best
equilibrium. In some instances, however, the decision to use temporary
law may be wrong. In such an instance, people may have to switch back to
the earlier equilibrium at some cost.
Consider the smoking ban example. When the ban on smoking took
effect, bars might have hired waitstaff who preferred to work in a smokefree environment. When the temporary smoking ban lapses, those
employees are more likely to leave for other jobs, forcing the bar owners to
find and hire new employees. Of course, the very fact that the ban is
temporary may lead some bar owners to hedge their bets and refrain from
hiring employees who are more likely to quit in the future. Similarly, some
smoke-averse employees might avoid taking jobs in bars. But we
acknowledge that there will likely be some fixed costs from switching that
have to be born twice. Similarly, bars would not likely have had smokingrelated signage when all bars always allowed smoking. During the period
of regulation, bar owners may have to purchase signage that says “No
smoking allowed;” if they choose to allow smoking thereafter, they will
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need new signs that indicate that smoking is allowed. These are
unrecoverable switching costs that result from the temporary law.
2. Lower Quality Law
When a law is meant to be temporary, legislators might not invest
in writing the highest-quality law.78 It might be overbroad or
underinclusive in some respect, or it might target the wrong conduct.79 For
this reason, temporary law might work best when the temporary rule is
relatively simple, like a smoking ban, and not as well when the rule
requires complex legislative drafting.
Similarly, the law might not be enforced as rigorously as a permanent law
because the officers charged with its enforcement know that it is only
temporary. If under-enforcement dampens the law’s impact significantly,
then the informational value of the temporary law could be eliminated. If
no private parties are forced to change their conduct because the
temporary law is either unenforced or easily evaded, then the status quo
remains uninterrupted. It is important, then, that the law be designed and
enforced such that there is at least reasonable compliance. Indeed,
depending on the context, one might imagine creating a compliance trigger
for the law’s expiration rather than a simple calendar date. For example,
one might say that the will expire after eighteen months of a measurably
high level of compliance. This would work if compliance were reasonably
easy to measure, but not otherwise. For example, indoor smoking
compliance can be checked by devices that measure the chemical traces of
tobacco smoke in the ambient air. Yet temporary law will not be a good
mechanisms for discovering multiple equilibrium if there is a significant
chance of non-compliance and no easy way to agree on what the
compliance level is. Relatedly, a poorly designed temporary law might
fail to locate alternative equilibria, frustrating the objective of the enterprise
and creating duplicative switching costs without any gains. The behavioral
mechanisms that entrench the status quo and can thus create multiple
equlibria do not reverse themselves instantaneously. For instance, if a bar
Richard E. Myers II, Responding to the Time-Based Failures of the Criminal Law Through A
Criminal Sunset Amendment, 49 B.C. L. REV. 1327, 1371 (2008) (“[L]egislatures will take their
job less seriously because they know that the legislation is only temporary.”).
79 See Adam Winkler, Free Speech Federalism, 108 MICH. L. REV. 153, 160 (2009) (offering a
definition of high-quality and low-quality law).
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has allowed smoking for twenty years and then is forced by a temporary
law to ban smoking, the new non-smoking customers who show up on the
first non-smoking day do not immediately become “available.” They are
not yet the bar’s regulars, and will not be for some time. Similarly, bar
patrons and employees will not all feel as though they “own” an
entitlement to be free of smoke, for purposes of the endowment effect, on
the first day that such a law springs into existence. Adaptation to new
conditions also takes time, in some cases approximately two years.80
Accordingly, if a temporary law expires after too short a period, it
may not succeed in counteracting the behavioral tendencies that had
entrenched the previous status quo. Even if an alternative equilibrium
exists, the law may not succeed in discovering it. Private actors will have
undergone switching costs for no reason.
On the other hand, a temporary law with an unnecessarily long
duration can impose needless costs as well. The longer the temporary law,
the longer that private parties are stuck in an inefficient governmentallymandated situation (for instance, a complete smoking ban). If a temporary
law lasting two years would be sufficient to locate a new low-smoking
equilibrium, and a city council passes a ten-year ban, those additional eight
years were unnecessary and costly. This is true whether or not a lowsmoking equilibrium exists. Regardless of whether a new equilibrium
exists or whether private parties will return to the old equilibrium, the
extra time spent under a complete prohibition generates social costs.
*

*

*

Temporary law provides a number of advantages over permanent
law. For our purposes, the most important of these advantages is the ability
to expose path-dependent equilibria and reveal situations in which
multiple alternative equilibria might exist. It is for this reason that we
believe temporary law offers the most direct and appropriate response to
the multiple-equilibria problems we described above.
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See Bronsteen et al., Hedonic Adaptation, supra note 77.
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III.

A TEMPORARY SMOKING BAN: THE CASE OF CHAMPAIGN

We know of no smoking ban that was explicitly designed as
temporary. However, we have studied one jurisdiction which
unintentionally adopted a temporary ban, in that it enacted and later
repealed a ban on smoking in bars. This section describes the ban in some
detail.
Champaign (population 81,055) and Urbana (population 41,250) are
twin cities that are host to the University of Illinois, the flagship public
university of the state.81 The two cities are the largest in mostly rural
Champaign County, and many local residents believe that they have
different characters, with Urbana being more liberal and willing to regulate
business.82 The cities have different municipal governments, but share
certain governmental functions through special districts, such as a Mass
Transit District and a Public Health District.
Like many municipalities around the country, Champaign and its
neighboring city of Urbana were subject to pressure from anti-smoking
groups, as well as resistance from bar owners and libertarians who sought
to retain smoking.83 In the late spring of 2006, Champaign and Urbana both
passed smoking bans, effective January 2007.84 While Urbana began taking
steps to implement the ban, however, political controversy continued in
Champaign. In reaction to the Champaign ban, candidates running for atlarge seats in the City Council cited the smoking ban—either their support

Population figures are from the 2010 U.S. Census. Champaign County Statistical
Abstract 2012 at 5, available at http://www.ccrpc.org/dev/2012stats/SA2011_050712.pdf [last
visited Feb. 1, 2013] . A third contiguous city, the village of Savory, reported 7280 residents
in a special census in 2010.
82 See e.g. Champaign-Urbana, available at http://wikitravel.org/en/Champaign-Urbana
[last visited Feb. 1, 2013] (“Urbana is seen as the more politically liberal and pastoral of the
two, and Champaign is seen as having more of a big-city feel.”)
83 The ban proponents were known as the C-U Smokefree Alliance; the opponents were
C-U Puff (People United For Freedom) formed to counter the smoking ban and debunk
claims of a link between second hand smoke and cancer rates. See Mike Monson, CU
Smokefree Alliance Turns its Attention to Urbana, The News-Gazette (Nov. 8, 2005),
http://www.news-gazette.com/news/politics-and-government/2005-11-08/cu-smokefreealliance-turns-its-attention-urbana.html?nomobile=true.
84 Greg Kline, Urbana Council Votes in Favor of Preliminary Smoking Ban, The NewsGazette (June 6, 2006), http://www.news-gazette.com/news/health/miscellaneous/2006-0606/urbana-council-votes-favor-preliminary-smoking-ban.html [last visited Feb. 1, 2013].
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or their opposition—as a motivation for entering politics.85 One argued that
the ban was part of an attack on property rights.86 The ban also led to a
challenge to two-term mayor Jerry Schweighart of Champaign, who had
run unopposed in the previous election. The challenger cited the smoking
ban as a reason for his candidacy.87
In City Council elections held in 2006, ban opponents supported a
slate of candidates that promised to repeal the ban, and these candidates
won handily. Ban proponents expressed disappointment but hoped that a
statewide ban under discussion would pre-empt the issue. On May 1, 2007,
the Illinois House of Representatives passed a smoking ban that would
take effect January 1, 2008, but it required the signature of the Governor.88
The proposed state ban was stricter than the local ordinances as it banned
smoking in all workplaces.
The same day, Champaign Mayor Schweighart announced that he
would nevertheless seek an immediate repeal of the smoking ban for bars.89
At the next City Council meeting on May 15, the repeal passed, effective
immediately.90 It affected only bars, so restaurants remained smoke-free.
Champaign thus became the first jurisdiction in the United States to repeal

Mike Monson, 15 Candidates Will Vie for Council Seat. The News-Gazette (Aug. 2,
2006),
http://www.news-gazette.com/news/politics-and-government/2006-08-02/15candidates-will-vie-council-seat.html [last visited Feb. 1, 2013].
86 Mike Monson, Primary to be held for At-Large City Council Candidates, (Dec. 16, 2006),
http://www.news-gazette.com/news/politics-and-government/2006-12-16/primary-be-heldlarge-city-council-candidates.html [last visited Feb. 1, 2013].
87 Mike Monson, Political Newcomer Joins Race for Champaign Mayor, The News-Gazette
(Dec. 19, 2006) http://www.news-gazette.com/news/politics-and-government/2006-1219/political-newcomer-joins-race-champaign-mayor.html?nomobile=true.
88 The bill was not signed into law until June 2007. See Illinois Governor Signs Smoking
Ban (July 24, 2007), http://commonlaw.findlaw.com/2007/07/illinois-govern.html [last visited
Feb. 1, 2013]. The Champaign City Council thus acted in a situation of some legal
uncertainty.
89 Mike Monson, Champaign Mayor to Seek Repeal of Smoking Ban, May 2, 2007, available
at
http://www.news-gazette.com/news/politics-and-government/2007-05-02/champaignmayor-seek-smoking-ban-repeal-may-15.html [last accessed February 1, 2013].
90 Mike Monson, Champaign Repeals Three-month Old Smoking Ban on Bar, Club Smoking,
May
16,
2007,
available
at
http://www.news-gazette.com/news/politics-andgovernment/2007-05-16/champaign-repeals-3-month-old-ban-bar-club-smoking.html [last
accessed February 1, 2013].
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a smoking ban, and provides an example of a temporary smoking ban.91
Figure 3 below lays out the sequence of events.

Figure 3: Timeline of Champaign-Urbana Smoking Ban
Date

Champaign

May 2006
June 2006

Adopts smoking ban

January 2007

Ban takes effect Jan. 31
Ban takes effect Jan. 1
State Senate introduces Smoke Free Illinois Act
State Senate adopts Smoke Free Illinois Act92
State House adopts Smoke Free Illinois Act
Repeals smoking ban
Ban remains in effect
Governor Blagojevich signs statewide ban
State ban takes effect

March 2007
May 2007
July 2007
January 2008

Urbana

Adopts smoking ban

Governor Blagojevich signed the statewide ban in July.93 Note that
because of the subsequent statewide ban, the Champaign repeal was also

Cf. AFP, Geneva smoking ban returns after one-year break, available at
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gEmjS2OSGhDpG58Hke6nwqmSPZw [last accessed January 30, 2013] (describing smoking ban in Geneva
Switzerland that was overturned by court ); see also Norcross Repeals City Wide Smoking Ban,
July 3, 2012, available at http://atlanta.cbslocal.com/2012/07/03/norcross-repeals-city-widesmoking-ban/ [last accessed June 4, 2013] (reporting repeal of ban in Norcross, Georgia
after several months in force); No to Nanny: Kentucky County Repeals Indoor Smoking Ban,
available at http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2011/02/17/no-to-nanny-kentucky-countyrepeals-indoor-smoking-ban/ [last accessed June 4, 2013] (describing repeal in Campbell
County, Kentucky); Johnson County Repeals Smoking Ban, available at
http://indianapublicmedia.org/news/johnson-county-repeals-smoking-ban-41710/ [last
accessed June 4, 2013] (repeal by Johnson County, Indiana of ban stricter than the statewide
ban).
92 See http://votesmart.org/bill/votes/12788#.UbaSyncudj8.
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temporary in character, lasting only 7.5 months. While it was uncertain at
the time of the repeal whether the governor would in fact sign the state
ban, bar owners who had undergone switching costs to comply with the
ban (discarding ashtrays, disabling ventilation systems) would have had to
consider the likelihood of a state ban coming into effect when evaluating
whether to absorb the costs of switching back to smoking. In the aftermath
of the repeal, 30 of 50 bars that we observed returned to smoking.94
While some of the bar owners that did not return to allowing
smoking noted that they had learned about the benefits of non-smoking
from the ban, they also cited the imminent statewide ban as a reason not to
switch.95 Accordingly, the subsequent statewide ban presents a potential
confounding factor. Nonetheless, we present our findings regarding
smoking and compliance levels because we believe they shed at least some
light on the effects of temporary law in the presence of multiple equilibria.
We sent observers to monitor the level of smoking and rates of
patronage before and after the smoking ban took effect. For each bar, we
had researchers pay at least three visits at different times of day during the
week before and after the ban took effect (January 1, 2007 in Urbana;
January 31, 2007 in Champaign). Our observers were instructed to note the
total number of patrons in the bar over the course of an hour, and the
number who smoked during any point in their visit. Bar staff were
excluded from the analysis.
Our initial research concern was to evaluate compliance with the
ban. We found overwhelming compliance with the law, despite a very
weak enforcement structure. (The official enforcement policy requires
repeated warnings, and both police and the public health district had
expressed reluctance to imposing even the minimal punitive fines available

Press Release, Gov. Blagojevich signs legislation making Illinois smoke-free; drastically
reduces the risk of second-hand smoke for workers and the public, available at
http://www.idph.state.il.us/public/press07/7.23.07GovSmokeFreeIL.htm
[last
accessed
February 1, 2013].
94 Data on file with authors. Several bars were closed for the summer, making it
impossible to determine their policy.
95 Mike Monson, Several Champaign Bars ‘Not Going Back’ (May 14, 2007), http://newsgazette.com/news/business/miscellaneous/2007-05-14/several-champaign-bars-not-goingback.html [last visited Feb. 1, 2013] (Cody Sokolski noting that the ban made him feel better
when performing on stage, and also noting the sunk costs of switching, as well as potential
for confusing customers by reverting before the ban).
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under the ordinances).96 Out of 15 bars in Urbana, all but one immediately
exhibited perfect compliance, and that bar was the subject of a complaint.
In Champaign, we observed perfect compliance in 63 establishments. The
high levels of compliance suggest that the law was working, even without
formal enforcement efforts.97 In addition, for bars in both Urbana and
Champaign, we observed an average of 21.3 patrons in attendance before
the ban (n=281) and an average of 24.4 in the first month after the ban
(n=13). Though the sample sizes are too small to demonstrate statistical
significance, this suggests at a minimum that the pre-ban equilibrium may
not have been uniquely optimal. Furthermore, newspapers reported that
revenue was up for Champaign restaurants and bars after the ban.98
After the repeal took effect in Champaign on May 15, 2007, we were
able to study the responses of the 30 bars that reinstituted smoking. There
were 15 bars for which we had at least three observations of patronage and
smoking behavior both before the ban and after the repeal. (We also
observed patronage and smoking rates in the interim stage, when the ban
was in effect.) We observed that post-repeal, the bars that returned to
smoking had higher levels of patronage (mean = 44.7) than they did before
the ban went into effect (mean = 29.8). They also observed higher
percentages of smoking patrons (37.9% post-repeal vs. 31% pre-ban).99
Seventy-five per cent of the bars that returned to smoking showed higher
patronage post-repeal, while 71% showed higher concentrations of
Fines ranged from $165 to $750. Urbana Code of Ordinances 1-18 ($165) and 1-10
($750). See also interview 43 (Champaign police department).
97 This may be an example of what one of us has called the expressive role of law. See
Richard McAdams, The Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339 (2000).
98 Charles Vance, Smoking Ban Revenue, WCIA 3 Report (May 7, 2007), available at
http://www.smokersclubinc.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=4146
[last
accessed November 22, 2012]. Some reports noted a decline in restaurant tax revenue for
the first two months followed by an increase. Mike Monson, Smoking Bans’ Effects on C-U
Tax Revenue Sparks Debate, News-Gazette May 9, 2007, available at Mike Monson, Champaign
Mayor to Seek Repeal of Smoking Ban, May 2, 2007 [last accessed January 31, 2013] (revenues
down in February but up in March 2007).
99 The n is too small to demonstrate statistical significance. Furthermore, we cannot rule
out that the observed differences in patronage are attributable to the different times of year.
The ban was repealed in summer, and it is possible that more people attend bars at that
time. On the other hand, the time of year would likely not explain higher levels of smoking.
During summer, people may be able to go outside to smoke, which is less pleasant in
Champaign in the winter. We would thus expect to observe more smokers inside bars in the
winter than in the summer.
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smokers.100 These data are consistent with the idea that the initial
equilibrium in which all bars allowed smoking was sub-optimal relative to
a mixed equilibrium in which some bars allowed smoking and others did
not. The data also provide some evidence for sorting and market
segmentation, since the concentrations of smoking were higher after the
ban was repealed than before it was put into effect.
Our interviews revealed a number of different motivations for
returning to smoking. Some of the bar owners felt that they lost business
during the ban, and our observations were consistent with this. Thirteen of
the fifteen bars that we observed at least three times had lower average
patronage during the ban then they had beforehand.101 Some identified
marginally higher costs in the form of having to run outdoor heaters for
smokers in winter.102 In addition, some bar owners were themselves
smokers who felt personally besieged by the ban.103 At least one bar
owner, interviewed during the temporary ban, asserted that his bar would
revert if the ban were repealed because “all bars would”; but the bar failed
to revert after the repeal.104
In short, there were three stages of regulatory development. In the
first, there was no regulation at all, and 100% of bars had smoking. In the
second stage, with a ban, 0% of bars had smoking. In the third stage, after
the temporary regulation was repealed, 60% of bars had smoking while
40% did not. It is our speculation that this last distribution more closely
approximated the actual levels of demand for smoking establishments than
did the status quo ante. The temporary law helped to reveal this
equilibrium.
Our interview data are consistent with our theoretical account: bar
owners who did not switch back reported a variety of motivations. While
some of them did mention the possibility of the state ban, others reported
that they had themselves learned how pleasant it was not to have
pervasive smoke. One interviewee reported that he himself was a
nonsmoker, but had feigned opposition to the ban to keep customers.105
Data on file with authors.
From an average of 29.8 patrons to an average of 24.8. This is despite the fact that
most bars experienced higher patronage.
102 Interview R2, April 13, 2007, on file with authors.
103 Interview R2, April 13, 2007.
104 Interview R4, April 13, 2007.
105 Interview T14A, May 30, 2007.
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101
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Another, who had opposed the ban on libertarian grounds, disclosed that
he had not reversed the decision to ban smoking because he found that
nonsmoking provided a superior environment.106 While it is only
anecdotal, some interviewees reported that the potential statewide ban was
not an issue in their decision not to return to smoking. Lower cleaning
costs and the transition costs of re-installing air purification equipment
were also cited as reasons for remaining non-smoking, even after smoking
was again allowed.107 These rationales suggest that even without the
subsequent statewide ban, the temporary smoking ban would have led to a
new post-ban equilibrium in which less than 100% of bars allowed
smoking.

IV. FURTHER EXAMPLES
We believe that the argument for temporary law generalizes to
many forms of paternalistic regulation, as well as other issues on which
there are likely to be multiple equilibria but significant barriers to
determining the optimal one. In this section we describe several other
situations in which we believe that multiple equilibria exist and temporary
laws could be profitably employed or are already in use.
A.

Seat Belts

Seat belts save lives. However, before they were in widespread use,
people felt that they were inconvenient and uncomfortable.108 This led to
very low rates of seatbelt usage and the adoption, in the United States, of
“technology-forcing regulation” that required automobile manufacturers to
include so-called “passive restraints” in all cars.109 This led in turn to the
technological development of automatically-locking seatbelts (which were
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Interview T17, June 2, 2007.
Interview R5, May 29, 2007.
108 Anthony Ogus, ECONOMICS, REGULATION AND THE LAW 272 (1993) (assessing costs and
benefits of seatbelts and including discomfort); Jerry L. Mashaw and David Harfst, THE
STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 272 (1990) (political struggle over seat belt laws).
109 Id.
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wildly unpopular) and airbags.110 The issue was a major regulatory
battleground, with successive political administrations adopting different
rules.111 Today, many states have enacted mandatory seat belt laws, which
have been shown to increase seat belt usage. These laws are permanent.
We can imagine a path dependency argument that supports only
limited government intervention in the form of a temporary law. We will
not rehearse all the reasons that seat belt use might have multiple
equilibria, but here are two. First, there are social network effects when
drivers have passengers because, when usage in a society is low, a
passenger who wears a seat belt may insult the driver by suggesting that
he or she is incompetent.112 Even the driver might incur social costs by
wearing a seat belt when no one else does because, against the social
practice, the driver seems unattractively timid, fearful, or incompetent. By
contrast, when seat belt usage is high, wearing a belt does not convey
distrust of the driver nor great timidity.113 Thus, there are multiple
equilibria.
Second, there are ways in which behavioral biases exacerbate the
standard switching costs. At first, wearing a seat belt is uncomfortable and
requires conscious effort, where after a time one develops a habit of
“buckling up” and doesn’t notice much discomfort. 114 Individuals must
decide whether to invest in developing the habit and might rationally
decide not to. Individuals with limited self-control115 might wish to invest
in the habit but nonetheless procrastinate; those subject to affective
forecasting errors116 will overestimate how long it takes to adjust to the
initial discomfort and therefore mistakenly decide not to acquire the habit.
In all of these cases, individuals who started out wearing seat belts would

Motor Vehicle Manufacturing Association v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (describing 17
year regulatory fight).
111 John David Graham, AUTO SAFETY: ASSESSING AMERICA’S PERFORMANCE 76 (1989)
(describing history of Congress and seatbelt laws).
112 Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 952 (1995)
(describing social meaning of putting on a seatbelt in a Budapest taxi).
113 Id.
114 See Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference With Private Preferences, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1129,
1137 (1986) (“Suppose that the costs of initial use are quite high; when drivers and
passengers first buckle the belts, they do so unwillingly. Suppose too that the costs
associated with buckling decrease sharply once one has gotten into the habit.”).
115 See supra text accompanying note X.
116 See supra text accompany note X.
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make different decisions than individuals who did not start out wearing
seat belts.
For this reason, if one rejects whole-hearted paternalism, one could
still justify temporary mandates under our theory. But the theory implies
that we should phase out such laws in states where they have existed for
some time (perhaps with an exception for new drivers, discussed below).
Having raised total usage to historically high rates, there is no longer a
social cost to wearing a seat belt as a driver or passenger. Having coerced
drivers into the experience of wearing a seat belt, most have developed the
habit now and would continue on without coercion. Those who would not
continue on might have strong (if idiosyncratic) reasons not to wear them.
As with smokers, the efficient outcome might be to permit those who
continue to prefer the risky behavior to have their way, given that a
temporary law is sufficient to cause most people to take the less risky
behavior.
Such temporary laws or the repeal of existing laws might treat new
drivers differently. A temporary condition for a new license might be the
requirement that one use a seat belt for a time, say two to four years, after
which the driver can obtain a license that does not require the behavior.
Drivers might adapt to the new condition and learn that they do not mind
the belt that they initially hated. In light of the health and safety benefits,
most of them might continue the behavior after it is no longer required. But
those who continue to find it extremely unpleasant can stop. In this way,
temporary regulation might preserve liberties while changing behavior for
the substantial majority of people.
B.

Affirmative Action

Proponents of affirmative action characterize the market as
producing a sub-optimal level of educational or workforce participation by
minorities, females, or other under-represented groups. The idea here
draws from path dependency. Given past patterns of educational and
employment discrimination, the removal of explicit discrimination alone
may be insufficient to is reveal an “optimal” equilibrium that reflects the
actual distribution of talent in society. Indeed, it is possible that there will
be continuing market failures based on information asymmetries. For
example, employers making hiring decisions may rely on existing levels of
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workforce participation in considering new hires. The result would be very
slow or even no progress toward an optimal hiring equilibrium.
Affirmative action is conceived of as helping to overcome this kind
market failure. It is usually considered to be a “temporary” remedy, a point
made quite explicit by Justice O’Connor in her Grutter opinion.117 In
upholding the University of Michigan’s use of race in undergraduate
admissions, O’Connor noted that "race-conscious admissions policies must
be limited in time" and suggested that the interest of the University in
utilizing such policies would not last more the a period of 25 years. A
similar argument has been made for Title VII. 118
Indeed, international law conceives of affirmative action as
inherently temporary in character, as the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination states that affirmative
action programs "shall in no case entail as a consequence the maintenance
of unequal or separate rights for different racial groups after the objectives
for which they were taken have been achieved." 119 The temporary and
remedial nature of affirmative action distinguishes it from “ordinary”
racial discrimination.
The affirmative action story fits the case for a temporary law. It is
easy to agree that the status quo ante produced an inefficient equilibrium,
because of the legacy of discrimination, continuing behavioral biases, and
underinvestment in human capital by those discriminated against as a
rational response to lack of opportunities. Discrimination entrenches the
status quo over time when markets are the only remedial mechanism. 120 At
the same time, it is unclear what the precise level of participation is for any
particular group in any particular market. An approach that sets quotas for
participation is an attempt to move toward a particular specified
equilibrium. It may be more efficient than the situation of no regulation, but
it is hard to tell, as the informational barriers are large. Affirmative action
can be viewed as an attempt to intervene in labor and educational markets

Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)
See John J. Donohue, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411 (1986) (argument
for temporary anti-discrimination laws).
119 G.A. Res. 2106 (XX), U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, U.N. Doc A/6014, at 48
(Dec. 21, 1965).
120 Daria Roithmayr, Locked In Inequality: The Persistence of Discrimination, 9 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 31 (2003); Daria Roithmayr, Locked In Segregation” 12 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 197
(2004).
117
118
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so as to better reveal the optimal equilibrium—that which would exist in
the absence of either a discriminatory starting point or mandatory
quotas.121

121

A temporary scheme may be superior to the status quo ante of no regulation, but
may also generate rent-seeking behavior that makes it difficult to let the law expire. Even
so, the need to review the programs after set periods puts some burden on proponents to
justify the extensions, and surely is superior to a permanent scheme. Malaysia provides an
interesting illustration of a temporary affirmative action scheme, but also the political
difficulties of modifying it once it has been established. When drafting the Malaysian
Constitution, the Reid Commission of the United Kingdom sought to ensure the special
position of the indigenous Malays, who formed a narrow majority of the population but
were economically far behind the ethnic Chinese and Indian subjects of British Malaya. The
Commission recommended setting aside a certain number of public service commissions,
business licenses, and university scholarships for Malays, but also suggested that these
provisions expire 15 years after independence. Report of the Federation of Malaya
Constitutional Commission 1957 (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office) ¶¶163-167,
available at http://www.krisispraxis.com/Constitutional%20Commission%201957.pdf [last
accessed February 1, 2013]. (describing current situation and noting that there was
agreement for continuing preferences on a temporary basis.) However, the affirmative
action scheme was retained after the subset period, and remains largely intact today.
Barbara Watson Andaya & Leonard Y. Andaya, A HISTORY OF MALAYSIA 297-303 (2001)
(describing ethnic tensions and violence, with New Economic Policy adopted as a solution.)
But see Joseph Chin, MRCB, Pos in focus after PM unveils new economic model, The Edge
Malaysia, available at http://www.theedgemalaysia.com/highlights/162642-mrcb-pos-infocus-after-pm-unveils-new-economic-model.html [last accessed Feb. 1, 2013] (Prime
Minister’s announcement of review and gradual phase-out of quotas).
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C.

Curfews

Another example of explicitly temporary law is a curfew. Curfews
are restrictions on presence in public spaces, usually adopted to combat
crime or to otherwise change the social dynamics of a particular locality.
The rationale is that the status quo ante represents a sub-optimal
equilibrium that can be remedied by a temporary disruption to the pattern
of social interaction. For example, if young people have the habit of
congregating each evening in a particular location, each individual will
have an expectation that others will show up at the same spot. If the people
in question are drug dealers or criminals, there may be significant
externalities from this equilibrium. A temporary ban can disrupt
expectations about where and when to congregate, and thus may change
the equilibrium level of crime or drug dealing after the ban is lifted.
In Laurel, Delaware, for example, Mayor John Shwed instituted an
emergency curfew for non-residents of the Carvel resident complex on
February 22, 2012. 122 The curfew was imposed in response to an increase in
violence and gang activity, and remained in effect from 10pm through
6am.123 The effect of the curfew was positive, and the town’s police chief
noted that it was followed by an almost 60% decrease in complaints of
criminal activities at the housing complex. As a result of reduced violence,
the Mayor decided not to extend the curfew and it was removed on
September 4th, 2012.124 City officials and residents believed that crime
would not go back to the pre-curfew level125 and, though there is no hard
data, there has been no news of rising crime.

Town of Laurel Police Department, Emergency Curfew for Non-Residents of Carvel
and Carvel Gardens Apartment Annex, Feb. 22, 2012, avialable at
http://www.townoflaurel.net/index.cfm?ref=28100 [last accessed January 12, 2012].
123 Id.
124 Tony Windsor, Laurel officials stop emergency curfew at public housing complex, Laurel
Star, available at
http://www.laurelstar.com/index.cfm?ref=42578&ref2=380 [last accessed January 12,
2012].
125 WBOC News, Laurel Plans to Let Emergency Curfew Expire, Sept. 14, 2012, Available at
http://www.wboc.com/story/19430430/town-plans-to-let-emergency-curfew-expire
[last
accessed January 12, 2012].
122
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Curfews like that found in Laurel are not uncommon, and have
been implemented in East St. Louis, Philadelphia, and other cities. 126 In a
democracy, permanent restrictions on liberty are frowned upon, so curfews
may be framed as temporary in nature, or else restricted to minors. For
example, the Philadelphia curfew adopted in October 2011, specifically
meant to respond to problems with flash mobs, is set to expire in December
2013.127 The Philadelphia Police Department notes that the law has been
effective in reducing crime and has incentivized the city to provide youth
with alternative activities including bowling nights and spending more
time at recreation centers.128 In short, curfews are a tool employed with
some regularity in democracies that illustrate the use of temporary law to
find superior equilibria. They are obviously superior relative to permanent
restrictions on liberty.
D. Traffic: Congestion Pricing in Sweden
Traffic is another problem potentially amenable to analysis from the
perspective of multiple equilibria. Traffic causes all kinds of externalities,
and is universally regulated in some form or another. Many cities have
experimented with so-called congestion pricing, in which costs of driving
in crowded downtown areas increases during peak usage times. One might
imagine that an effect of this pricing would be to incentivize drivers to take
public transit or other alternative means of transportation. If so, it might be
conceivable that a temporary scheme of congestion pricing would be
sufficient to induce lower levels of driving.
We know of one experiment with temporary regulation in this
regard. From January to July 2006, Stockholm instituted a trial period of
congestion pricing to reduce traffic. The pricing program put a flat rate of
$2.60 on all vehicles entering Stockholm during peak hours, and a rate

See, e.g., Barry Leibowitz, Curfew, Dress Code Imposed on Teens to Combat Crime in East
St. Louis, CBS News, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-57521814504083/curfew-dress-code-imposed-on-teens-to-combat-crime-in-east-st-louis/
[last
accessed, February 1, 2013] (East St. Louis); Maria Gonzalez, City Curfew Law Creates
Controversy,
The
Daily
Pennsylvanian,
February
13,
2012,
http://www.thedp.com/index.php/article/2012/02/city_curfew_law_creates_controversy[last
accessed, February 1, 2013] (Philadelphia).
127 Id.
128 Id.
126
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ranging from $1.30 to $2 for other times during the day.129 By the time the
trial ended on July 31, 2006, Stockholm had experienced a 22% drop in
traffic and travel time.130
Following the trial period, a referendum was held in September
2006 allowing residents to decide whether to reintroduce the system on a
permanent basis. The pricing system was approved by 52% of the city’s
voters, and was thus re-introduced in August 2007.131 Both the congestion
policy and the subsequent period of driving without a fee were temporary
in character.
The initial experiment was conducted on a temporary basis
primarily for political reasons.132 In the 2002 national election, the Social
Democrats won a plurality and formed a government by attracting the
support of the Environmentalist Party. In return, the Social Democrats
agreed to the congestion pricing experiment. They also had to convince
the Stockholm Social Democrats, who had promised not to engage in
congestion pricing, to implement the experiment. Popular support for the
program was low before the trial started. A poll in fall 2005 showed that
around 55% of Stockholm residents believed it was a bad decision to
conduct a congestion pricing trial. In fact, when the trial started, public
opposition to the fees ran as high as 75%.133 By May 2006, however, support
had increased: only 41% of Stockholm residents thought the trial was a bad
idea.134 The temporary law thus revealed information about preferences.
Support consistently increased and by May 2011, support for the policy
was at 70%. The reason for this support is still unclear: it could be because
Brad Plumer, How Sweden Cut Traffic Congestion, The Washington Post (Dec. 15,
2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/how-sweden-cut-trafficcongestion/2011/12/15/gIQA3xPVwO_blog.html.
130 Derrick Z. Jackson, Finding the Cure for Traffic, The Boston Globe (Aug. 5, 2012),
http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2012/08/04/congestion-charges-fixing-traffic-forprice-cup-coffee/Z4VWqAK3t2vVR5Im02kmjK/story.html.
131 Björn Hårsman & John M. Quigley, Political and Public Acceptability of Congestion
Pricing: Ideology and Self-Interest in Sweden, 29 J. Pol’y Analysis & Mgmt. 854, 856 (2010)
available at http://www.uctc.net/access/38/access38_congestion_pricing_sweden.shtml [last
accessed February 1, 2013].
132 Id.
133 See Jackson, supra n.130.
134 Muriel Beser Hugosson & Jonas Eliasson, The Stockholm Congestion Charging System –
An Overview of the Effects After Six Months. (Feb. 2, 2006) (Proceeding of European Transport
Conference,
Strasbourg,
France),
available
at
http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/nchrp/nchrp_syn_377.pdf.
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people enjoyed fewer traffic jams and delays, people adjusted their driving
patterns, people shifted to public transit, or a combination of the three.135
Interestingly, although a new political equilibrium was produced
by the temporary law, the underlying levels of driving were unaffected
during the immediate post-trial period. The congestion policy was not in
place between July 2006 (when the trial period ended) and August 2007
(when the policy was re-introduced permanently). During this period,
traffic rose close to the level it had been before congestion pricing was ever
implemented. Had driving levels stayed low, of course, there would have
been less need for a permanent congestion pricing policy.136 So one
outcome of this experiment was to reveal that a temporary law was
insufficient to reorder the underlying behavior that was the target of
regulation. This was not a case of multiple equilibria, a fact which the
temporary ban revealed. We include this example to illustrate that
temporary law may occasionally fail to validate the existence of a second
equilibrium. When this is the case, policymakers must simply adopt the
approach that Swedish authorities followed here: decide whether a
permanent law is warranted.
E.

Bank Holidays and Trading Curbs

Examples of temporary law can also be found in the financial
sector. Consider first the problem of a run on a bank. Bank runs are caused
when too many depositors try to pull their deposits out of a bank in too
short of a time frame.137 Even when the bank is solvent, it might not have
sufficient liquidity to pay all of the depositors at once, causing the bank to
fail.138 The problem can be self-reinforcing: the more depositors withdraw
their money from the bank, the more that the remaining depositors must
fear that the bank will not have sufficient reserves to pay them if they
attempt to withdraw funds.139
Accordingly, a bank run can be driven by a rational collective
action problem: it is separately rational for each individual to rush to the
135

See Plumer, supra n. 129.
See Jackson, supra n. 130.
137 Helen A. Garten, What Price Bank Failure, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 1159, 1168-69 (1989)
(describing bank runs).
138 Id.
139 Id.
136
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bank and withdraw her money, even if it would be collectively superior if
they were all to leave their money on deposit.140 They can also be caused
by behavioral errors, namely panic—an irrational stampede to the exit.141
We can thus conceive of the banking system as operating at one of
two equilibria: a “stable” equilibrium, in which banks are solvent,
depositors have no need to pull out their money, and no one is panicked;
and a “running” equilibrium, in which banks may lack necessary liquidity,
depositors are in the midst of a race to withdraw their funds, and panic is
widespread. Both of these equilibria are self-reinforcing, in the sense that
no individual has an incentive to change her behavior absent an exogenous
shock of some sort (such as a news report that a bank has become
insolvent).142
Suppose that one or more banks tip into a dangerous “running”
equilibrium and depositors are racing to withdraw their deposits. How
might policymakers trigger a switch to a stable equilibrium? The solution
that President Franklin Roosevelt employed during the Great Depression
was a temporary law: a “bank holiday” during which banks were closed
and no money could be deposited and withdrawn.143 These bank holidays
typically only lasted a few days, but nonetheless they effectively flipped
the status quo. Before the inception of the temporary law, banks and
customers were stuck in a running equilibrium. When the law elapsed, the
status quo was zero activity—no one had been making withdrawals,
precisely because of the holiday.
If we believed that only one equilibrium—a running equilibrium—
was possible, we should have expected a bank run to resume immediately
after a bank holiday ended. But this is not what occurred. Roosevelt’s bank
holidays were generally quite successful at ending bank runs.144 This
indicates that a simple change in the starting point, produced by temporary
law, can result in a very different outcome due to path dependence.

Krishna Mantapragada, Depositors as a Source of Market Discipline, 9 YALE J. ON REG.
543, 560-61 (1992) (describing the mechanisms that can trigger bank runs).
141 Id.
142
See Taipei Times, News Report Triggers Another Bank Run, available at
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2000/05/25/0000037364 (May 25, 2000).
143 Jerry W. Markham, The Subprime Crisis – A Test Match for the Bankers: Glass-Steagall vs.
Gramm-Leach-Bliley, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. LAW 1081, 1091 (2010) (offering a description of
Roosevelt’s bank holidays).
144 Id. (describing the success of bank holidays at stabilizing the banking system).
140
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Trading curbs, sometimes known as trading “circuit breakers,” play
a similar role in arresting steep declines in securities markets. Just like a
bank run, a stock market crash or a precipitous drop in the price of a single
stock might be caused by either rational or irrational factors.145 From a
rational perspective, if one investor sees other investors selling a stock (or
many stocks), causing its price to drop, she might rationally choose to sell
as well in order to avoid being left holding a much lower-priced asset.146
This could be the case even if she believes that the stock is actually worth
more than the current price—she may need liquidity in the near future and
be unable to hold onto the stock long enough to wait for it to rise. 147 And
of course she may take the drop in the stock’s price as information that the
stock is worth much, much less than she believed. 148 What she believes to
be true information could actually be an information cascade,149 in which
each individual believes that the others have valuable information when in
fact no one (or only the few people who trigger the cascade) know
anything of significance.150
On the other hand, investors might be irrationally panicking about
a stock (or an entire market or economy) and needlessly rushing to unload

145 See, e.g., Robert J. Shiller, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (Princeton University Press, 2nd
ed. 2005) (market irrationality); Burton G. Malkiel, The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its
Critics, 17 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 59, 73-74 (2003) (“Share prices can be highly sensitive as a
result of rational responses to small changes in interest rates and risk perceptions.”). See
generally Richard A. Brealey et al., Principles of Corporate Finance 340-68 (McGraw-Hill/Irwin,
Global ed. 10th ed. 2011).
146 See Gadi Barlevy & Pietro Veronesi, Rational Panics and Stock Market Crashes 2 (Ctr.
For Research in Security Prices, Working Paper No. 483, 2000) (explaining method by which
rational uninformed investors sell stocks when observing price drop).
147 See, e.g., Antonio E. Bernardo & Ivo Welch, Liquidity and Financial Market Runs, 119 Q.
J. ECON. 135, 135 (2004) (describing how a “liquidity shock” may force investor to sell
stocks).
148 See Kenneth French, Crash Testing the Efficient Market Hypothesis, in 3 NBER
MACROECONOMICS ANNUAL 277, 277-86 (Stanley Fischer ed., 1988) (“[E]conomic agents
rationally combine their own private information with the information they infer from
observed prices and value. . . . [Study suggests] investors over-react to each other’s
trades.”). See generally Joseph E. Stiglitz, Symposium on Bubbles, 4 JOURNAL ON ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVES 13 (1990) (discussing divergent views on the extent to which prices of assets
represent “fundamental” values).
149 Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go To Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71,
82-83 (2000).
150 Robert J. Schiller, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 153-165 (2000).
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securities and hide their money in something safer. 151 In either case, the
stock market is trapped in a self-destructive equilibrium.152 This is
opposed to the typical market equilibrium in which investors are not
panicked and are not chasing one another into a downward spiral.
The solution to the problem of stock market crashes is a temporary
law very similar to Roosevelt’s bank holidays. Every major securities
exchange in the United States imposes trading curbs, otherwise known as
“circuit breakers,” that automatically cut off trading in a stock or an entire
market when that market falls by a certain percentage in a single day.153
These circuit breakers are even more temporary than bank holidays: they
typically last only until the end of the trading day.154 But just like bank
holidays, they reverse the status quo ante. Before the circuit breaker takes
effect, the market is stuck in a “running” equilibrium. After the circuit
breaker has lapsed (the very next day), the market is starting from a stable
equilibrium. If there is in fact only one possible equilibrium—that is, if the
stock market crash is based on correct, rational valuations of the
securities—then we should expect the crash to resume the very next day as
the running equilibrium re-emerges. But in fact market circuit breakers
often halt stock market crashes, with the market reverting to a stable
equilibrium and rising the next day. 155 Such is the power of temporary law
to locate a second potential equilibrium, even when that temporary law
lasts only part of a day.156
See, e.g., id.; Joseph E. Stiglitz, Symposium on Bubbles, 4 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 13
(1990); see also Allen M. Poteshman & Vitaly Serbib, Clearly Irrational Financial Market
Behavior: Evidence from the Early Exercise of Exchange Traded Stock Options 29-21 (Office for
Futures and Options Research, Paper No. 01-02, 2001) (finding evidence of irrational market
behavior).
152 It is of course possible that the stock or the market is highly over-valued and the
crash is appropriate. But it is widely believed that stock market crashes (or run-ups)
frequently occur even when there is no economic basis for them. See Schiller, supra note 150.
153 United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Investor Bulletin: New Measures to
Address
Market
Volatility,
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/circuitbreakersbulletin.htm (July 23, 2012).
154 See id.
155 See Beni Lauterbach & Uri Ben-Zion, Stock Market Crashes and the Performance of
Circuit Breakers: Empirical Evidence, 48 J. FIN. 1909, 1909 (1993) (collecting literature and
finding that “circuit breakers . . . reduced the next-day opening order imbalance and the
initial price loss”).
156 Of course, not all temporary interventions in the market are so successful. In August
1971, President Richard Nixon sought to curb inflation by imposing temporary wage and
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V. CONCLUSION
Conflicts between libertarians and those in favor of regulation,
along with new attention to behavioral biases, have motivated a search for
more effective and less intrusive regulatory devices. In this paper, we
highlight one such mechanism: temporary law. We show that under certain
conditions, it is possible to utilize temporary law to identify information on
the most efficient outcome, and to do so in a way that is less politically
costly than an equivalent permanent law. These conditions occur when (1)
there are multiple equilibria and good reasons for believing that the status
quo is stuck in an inefficient equilibrium; and (2) there are informational
barriers to identifying the superior equilibrium.
Using the example of smoking bans, we have shown that
temporary law is plausible, and likely to be superior to a permanent law on
several dimensions. The temporary approach will be better at revealing
information than a permanent ban, which imposes a new equilibrium
without establishing that it is the optimal equilibrium. A temporary ban
will certainly be less intrusive of the liberties of smokers. And it is likely to
be politically easier to adopt, given that the costs will not be borne
permanently. The explicitly experimental, information-forcing rational of
temporary law may win over some opponents of particular policies. The
idea of temporary law easily generalizes, as we show by applying it
beyond the smoking example to seat belt mandates, affirmative action
policies, curfews, traffic regulation, and bank holidays.

price controls. Some policymakers seemed to believe that the United States was stuck in an
inflationary equilibrium, in which wages and prices collectively spiraled higher, and that a
temporary ban on increases would restore a lower-inflation equilibrium. That turned out
not to be the case, as inflation continued to increase throughout the decade in the face of
repeated unsuccessful interventions. See
http://www.econreview.com/events/wageprice1971b.htm.
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